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THE NEW AMERICAN PATENT ACT IN THE
LIGHT OF COMPARATIVE LAW: PART I I
Stefan A. Riesenfeld t
STRAIGHTENING THE ROAD TO THE PATENT
Task and Controlling Policies
Expeditious issuance of patents for inventions is of vital interest
to society and, at least normally, to the inventor. Since the statutory
monopoly expires seventeen years from the time of issue of the patent 1
and the invention thereupon becomes an untrammeled part of the
public domain,2 society has a recognized claim that public access to the
full benefits of the invention is not unduly postponed. The inventor's
position, however, is more equivocal. On the one hand, speedy issu-
ance of the patent may be of importance to him, because he obtains the
exclusionary right only upon the grant of the patent and is only then
entitled to protect his invention against infringement 3 On the other
hand, the limited duration of the monopoly might be an incentive to
strive for a delay in the issuance of the patent by either postponing the
filing of the application or protracting further prosecution thereof.4
* This is the second of two articles dealing with the new Patent Act. In the
prior article, 102 U. OF PA. L. REv. 291-322 (1954), Mr. Riesenfeld discussed changes
in the substantive aspects of patentability. This second article deals with changes
in patent procedure before the Patent Office and in the courts. Ed.
' LL.B., University of California, S.J.D., Harvard University; Professor of Law,
University of California; Author of THE LAW OF MUTUAl. INSURANCE COMPANIES
(in German 1933), PROTECTION OF COASTAL FISHERIES UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW
(1942), MODERN SOCIAL LEGISLATION (1951).
1. 66 STAT. 804 (1952), 35 U.S.C.A. § 154 (Supp. 1953).
2. The Supreme Court has carefully barred all attempts at securing to the
patent owner any type of exclusive rights in the Invention subsequent to the expira-
tion of the patent. See, e.g., Singer Mfg. Co. v. June Mfg. Co., 163 U.S. 169
(1896); Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111 (1938); Scott Paper
Co. v. Marcalus Mfg. Co., 326 U.S. 249 (1945). See also Special Equipment Co. v.
Coe, 324 U.S. 370, 378 (1945).
3. Gayler v. Wilder, 10 How. 477, 493 (U.S. 1850). See also 3 WAuxR,
PATENTS 1682 (7th ed., Deller, 1937).
4. For famous litigations involving the issuability, validity or scope of patents
which were obtained or claimed more than a decade after the making of the invention
or the filing of the original application see Woodbridge v. United States, 263 U.S.
50 (1923) (right to patent for gun projectile, the issuance of which had been de-
liberately delayed from 1852 until 1879) ; Columbia Motor Car Co. v. Duerr & Co.,
184 Fed. 893 (2d Cir. 1911) (scope of Selden patent for automobile, applied for in
1879, granted in 1895); DeForest Radio Co. v. General Electric Co., 283 U.S. 664
(1931) (validity of Langmuir patent for high vacuum tube, applied for in 1913,
granted in 1925).
(723)
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However, the law provides persuasive inducements for prompt action
by the inventor. Of the four main milestones on the road to the pat-
ent, viz., conception, reduction to practice,5 filing of the application, and
5. "Conception" and "reduction to practice" as relevant steps in the inventive
process are for the first time recognized in these terms by the new patent code, 66
STAT. 797 (1952), 35 U.S.C.A. § 102(g) (Supp. 1953). But these concepts and
expressions have held a firmly established place in the cases almost since the in-
ception of the American patent system and have formed the object of a vast number
of adjudications. For an exhaustive discussion see 1 RIVlSE AND CAESAR, INTmR-
FERNCE LAW AND PRAcrrcE 317-646 (1940). The originator of this specific
American terminology was Justice Story. He stated that as the final step in the
process of making a patentable invention the inventor must "reduce it to practice"
as early as 1813, in his opinion in Woodcock v. Parker, 30 Fed. Cas. 491, No. 17,971,
at 492 (C.C.D. Mass. 1813), and reiterated his dictum a few years later in Bedford
v. Hunt, 3 Fed. Cas. 37, No. 1,217, at 38 (C.C.D. Mass. 1817). In the leading case of
Reed v. Cutter, 20 Fed. Cas. 435, No. 11,645, at 438 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841), Justice
Story finally cast the doctrine in the accepted form: "An imperfect and incomplete
invention, resting in mere theory, or intellectual notion, or in uncertain experiments,
and not actually reduced to practice, and embodied in some distinct machinery, ap-
paratus, manufacture, or composition of matter, is not, and indeed cannot be, patent-
able under our patent acts. . . ." It is, however, important to note that in the
latter case the learned judge expressly conceded that a clause in the Patent Act of
1836 §15, 5 STAT. 123 (1836), which subsequently became REV. STAT. §4920(2)
(1875), 35 U.S.C. § 69(2) (1946), had reversed the prior rule requiring reduction to
practice for the determination of the first inventor and had accorded priority to the
inventor who first conceived of the invention, provided he "was using reasonable
diligence in adapting and perfecting the same." This doctrine of a reduction to
practice as a requisite and separate step in the making of a patentable invention was
quickly endorsed by the text-writers, e.g., CutTIs, A TREATISE O1 THE LXw OF
PATENTS 37 (1st ed. 1849), and subsequently accepted by the Supreme Court. Thus
in the leading case of Seymour v. Osborne, 11 Wall. 516, 552 (U.S. 1870), Justice
Clifford stated: ". . . but in order to constiute an invention, the party must have
proceeded so far as to have reduced his idea to practice, and embodied it in some
distinct form." Or, to give a more recent example, the Court, in United States v.
Dubilier Condenser Corp., 289 U.S. 178, 188 (1933), stated with reference to the
characteristics of patentable invention: "It is the result of an inventive act, the birth
of an idea and its reduction to practice . . . a concept demonstrated to be true by
practical application or embodiment in tangible form."
Unfortunately the doctrine predicating the existence of a patentable invention
on its reduction to practice misled some courts into exaggerating the requisite ex-
tent of this practice. It is noteworthy that the inherent dangers of Justice Story's
concepts were immediately recognized and adverted to by Judge Cranch who in-
sisted: "None of the patent laws have ever rcquired that the invention should be
in use or reduced to actual practice before the issuing of the patent, otherwise than
by a model, drawings, and a specification containing a written description of the
invention and of the manner of making, constructing, and using the same in such
full, clear, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it
appertains to make, construct, and use the same. . . . I do not consider the ex-
pression 'reduced to practice' as importing the bringing of the invention into use.
When applied to an invention, it generally means the reducing it into such form
that it may be used so as not to be mere theory." Heath v. Hildreth, 11 Fed. Cas.
1003, No. 6309, at 1004, 1006 (C.C.D.C. 1841). Possibly in an effort to reconcile some
of the vacillations in the judicial language, the Commissioners of Patents, during the
latter part of the past century, developed a doctrine of "constructive reduction to
practice," accomplished by the filing of an allowable application for patents. See,
e.g., the leading commissioners' decisions in Elges v. Miller, 1889 Com. Dec. 108, 46
O.G. PAT- OFF. 1514 (1889); Lorraine v. Thurmond, 1890 Com. Dec. 86, 51 O.G.
PAT. OFF. 1781 (1890). This differentiation between actual and constructive reduc-
tion to practice met with approval of the courts, first of the Court of Appeals of the
District of Columbia, see, e.g., Porter v. Louden, 7 App. D.C. 64, 72, 73 (1895);
Croskey v. Atterbury, 9 App. D.C. 207, 214 (1896); later of the other federal
courts, see, e.g., Automatic Weighing Mach. Co. v. Pneumatic Scale Corp., 166
Fed. 288 (1st Cir. 1909); McCreery Engineering Co. v. Massachusetts Fan Co.,
195 Fed. 498 (1st Cir. 1912). Although Justice Holmes in Milburn Co. v. Davis-
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final allowance, only the first step is removed from the subtle or not
so subtle pressures of the law. Failure to use diligence in reducing the
invention to practice might seriously jeopardize the inventor's priority I
which otherwise depends on the date of conception. 7 Delay in the filing
of the application might likewise entail loss of the right to the patent be-
cause of an intervening destruction of novelty' or because of abandon-
ment or forfeiture.' Finally, diligence in the prosecution of the patent
application, including appeals, is specifically insured by the statute by
providing that failure to prosecute the application within six months
after any action thereon, or within such shorter time, not less than
thirty days, as fixed in such action, shall be regarded as abandonment,
unless it be shown to the satisfaction of the Commissioner that such
delay was unavoidable.10
The public interest in prompt submission and disposition of patent
applications, however, is counterbalanced by an equally strong public
interest in a careful examination and scrutiny of patent claims as to
their practicability, validity, appropriate scope and definiteness. On
the one hand, it is unavoidable that the very existence of the examina-
tion system invites reliance by the public-a fact that has been recog-
nized and approved in the form of a presumption of validity established
Bournonville Co., 270 U.S. 390, 402 (1926), called the doctrine of constructive re-
duction to practice by an application a "fiction," the Supreme Court itself seems not
to have refused to accept it in substance and terms. Chapman v. Wintroath, 252
U.S. 126, 137 (1920).
6. For illustrative cases on the point, see Christie v. Seybold, 55 Fed. 69 (6th
Cir. 1893) ; Porter v. Louden, 7 App. D.C. 64 (1895) ; Yates v. Huson, 8 App. D.C.
93 (1896) ; Croskey v. Atterbury, 9 App. D.C. 207 (1896) ; Reichel v. Dorset, 262
Fed. 652 (D.C. Cir. 1920); Callaghan v. Gouverneur, 295 Fed. 961 (D.C. Cir.
1924); Jones v. Evans, 46 F.2d 197 (C.C.P.A. 1931); Radio Corp. of America v.
Radio Engineering Laboratories, Inc., 293 U.S. 1, 13 (1934); Marconi Wireless
Telegraph Co. v. United States, 320 U.S. 1, 35 (1943); Gregg v. Coakwell, 175
F.2d 575 (C.C.P.A. 1949). See also 1 RIviSE AND CAESAR, INTERFERENcE LAW AND
PRAcricE 537-646 (1940).
7. Marconi Wireless Telegraph Co. v. United States, 320 U.S. 1, 34 (1943)
(and authorities cited).
8. 66 STAT. 797 (1952), 35 U.S.C.A. §102(b) (Supp. 1953). This sub-section
bars the right of the first inventor to a patent if more than one year prior to the
date of his application the invention was either patented or described in a printed
publication anywhere or in public use or on sale in this country. For a discussion of
the evolution of this provision consult especially Andrews v. Hovey, 123 U.S. 267
(1887) ; Electric Storage Battery Co. v. Shimadzu, 307 U.S. 5 (1939).
9. For cases decided by the Supreme Court showing the development of the doc-
trines of implied abandonment, estoppel or forfeiture produced by undue delay in the
filing of the applications see Pennock v. Dialogue, 2 Pet. 1, 16 (U.S. 1829) (per
Story, J.); Kendall v. Winsor, 21 How. 322 (U.S. 1858); Agawam Company v.
Jordan, 7 Wall. 583, 607 (U.S. 1868); Smith v. Goodyear Dental Vulcanite Co.,
93 U.S. 486, 501 (1876); Consolidated Fruit-jar Co. v. Wright, 94 U.S. 92, 96
(1876) ; United States Rifle & Cartridge Co. v. Whitney Arms Co., 118 U.S. 22, 24
(1886); Beedle v. Bennett, 122 U.S. 71, 76 (1887); Woodbridge v. United States,
263 U.S. 50 (1923); Electric Storage Battery Co. v. Shimadzu, 307 U.S. 5, 15
(1939).
10. 66 STAT. 801 (1952), 35 U.S.C.A. § 133 (Supp. 1953). For the history of
this provision see especially Planing-Machine Co. v. Keith, 101 U.S. 479 (1879).
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first by case law "1 and recently by legislation.' On the other hand,
the scope of the patent grant determines to what extent others are ex-
cluded from practicing the art without a license from the patentee and
within what limits the art is left open for subsequent patentable inven-
tions. The Supreme Court has consistently exhibited great solicitude
both for the future inventor and for the industry affected by the limits
of the patentee's exclusive right."3 Although the underlying policy
judgments are not always clear cut 14 and are evidently subject to
change, 5 it is obvious that the examination must impose exacting
standards both on the applicant and the administrative agency in charge.
The scope of examination in the United States seems to be some-
what broader and more stringent than in the United Kingdom. There,
it is apparently uncertain whether the Patent Office has jurisdiction to
investigate the question of whether the purported invention involves
the necessary inventive step or is obvious,'6 except when the issue is
11. Corning v. Burden, 15 How. 252, 271 (U.S. 1853): "It is evident that a
patent, thus issued after an inquisition or examination, made by skillful and sworn
public officers, appointed for the purpose of protecting the public against false claims
or useless inventions, is entitled to much more respect, as evidence of novelty and
utility, than those formerly issued without any such investigation."
12. 66 STAT. 812 (1952), 35 U.S.C.A. §282 (Supp. 1953).
13. See particularly O'Reilly v. Morse, 15 How. 62, 113 (U.S. 1853) (per
Taney, C.J.); The Incandescent Lamp Patent, 159 U.S. 465, 474 (1895); General
Electric Co. v. Wabash Appliance Corp., 304 U.S. 364, 369 (1938) ; Mackay Radio
& Tel. Co. v. Radio Corp. of America, 306 U.S. 86, 94 (1939); United Carbon Co.
v. Binney & Smith Co., 317 U.S. 228, 236 (1942) ; Halliburton Oil Well Cementing
Co. v. Walker, 329 U.S. 1, 12 (1946).
14. Compare particularly the statement by Taft, C.J., in Eibel Process Co. v.
Minnesota & Ontario Paper Co., 261 U.S. 45, 63 (1923) : "Indeed, when one notes
the crude working of machines of famous pioneer inventions and discoveries, and
compares them with the modern machines and processes exemplifying the principle
of the pioneer discovery, one hesitates in the division of credit between the original
inventor and the improvers. .. ."
15. Thus the Supreme Court stated originally that the patentee is entitled to all
uses to which the invention can be put, no matter "whether he had conceived the
idea of the use or not," Roberts v. Ryer, 91 U.S. 150, 157 (1875) (Italics added) ;
Lovell Mfg. Co. v. Cary, 147 U.S. 623, 635 (1892); Corona Cord Tire Co. v.
Dovan Chemical Corp., 276 U.S. 358, 369 (1928). But in Radio Corp. of America
v. Radio Engineering Laboratories, Inc., 293 U.S. 1, 14 (1934) this rule was limited
to all "potencies and values at least dinly apprehended, and never discarded or for-
gotten . . . ." (Italics added), although subsequently the dictum again was cited
without the qualification. General Electric Co. v. Jewel Incandescent Lamp Co., 326
U.S. 242, 247 (1945). Moreover the recent recognition of process patents for new uses,
66 STAT. 797 (1952), 35 U.S.C.A. § 100(b) (Supp. 1953), certainly should affect the
policy regarding the scope of the monopoly of the original inventor. The decision
whether such patents for new uses of a patented invention will be independent or
subservient is bound to produce complicated policy problems. Dependency of the
new use patent seems to be assumed (under the old law) by Wachsner, Patentability
of New Uses, 34 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 397, 400 (1952), and judge Bland, concurring
in Application of Migrdichian, 156 F.2d 250, 254, 255 (C.C.P.A. 1946). The author
is indebted for the latter reference to his student, Mr. Rypinski.
16. Compare the negative statements in that respect by MmNHARDT, INVENTIONS,
PATENTS AND MONOPOLY 102, 104 (2d ed. 1950), with the seemingly opposite asser-
tion,by TERREu. AND SHEL.LY, LAW OF PATENTS 177 (9th ed. 1951).
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raised by an interested party in special opposition proceedingsY Fur-
thermore, if there is legitimate doubt as to whether the purported in-
vention relates to a manufacture or involves the requisite inventive
step the application must be allowed."" In the United States, on the
contrary, it is well settled that the examination extends to all substan-
tive and formal requirements of patentability, 9 such as the questions
of statutory subject matter, novelty, utility, standard of invention or
definiteness and proper phrasing and scope of claims20 It is evident
that the resulting task is staggering and requires a large and complex
organization' To give a rough idea to the uninitiated it may be men-
tioned that at present the Patent Office employs a staff of more than
1800 persons and maintains 65 examining divisions for the task of
scrutinizing the patent applications which during the recent past have
totaled approximately 67,000 per year.22 The total number of Ameri-
can patents issued approaches 2,700,000, relating to all conceivable
kinds of inventions.2" To facilitate search, patentable subject matter
is now divided into 313 main classes with around 45,000 sub-classes.2 4
Any proceedings which have certainty and definiteness as their
principal goal engender the threat of excessive formalism which, like a
blight, saps their vigor. Common law procedure succumbed to this
fate. American patent proceedings revealed some disturbing symptoms
of the same condition. The new patent code, fortunately, has straight-
ened the road to the patent, cleared away some of the obstacles and
filled in some of the most treacherous traps.
Simplifying the Application for Patent
The application for patent 2 sets the stage for the official action
of the Patent Office. As in many other legal proceedings culminating
in an authoritative determination of general interest-such as an ad-
17. U.K. Patents Act, 1949, 12, 13 & 14 GEo. 6, c. 87, § 14(1) (e).
18. MEINHARyr, INVENTIONS, PATENTS AND MONOPOLY 192 (2d ed. 1950);
TERRELL AND SHELLEY, LAw OF PATENTS 177 (9th ed. 1951).
19. 66 STAT. 801 (1952), 35 U.S.C.A. § 131 (Supp. 1953) ; 37 CODE FED. REGS.
§ 1.104 (1949) (Rules of Practice in Patent Cases).
20. Consult especially the PATENT OFFICE'S MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING
PROCEDURE §§ 706.03(a), 706.03(p), 706.02, 706.03(g), 706.03(d).
21. For a fairly recent discussion of the structure and the work of the Patent
Office see, Rosa, Patent Office Organizatio , Viewpoint and Classification, 31 J
PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 414 (1949).
22. Cf. REP. ComzMR PAT. FOR FISCAL YEAR 1953 at 4, 5 (1954).
23. By comparison it is perhaps of interest to note that during the year 1952
the number of patent applications in the German Federal Republic (with less than
50,000,000 inhabitants) exceeded 58,000. 32 WIRTSCHAFTSDENST 727 (1952).
24. Consult the indispensable United States Patent Office, Manual of Classifica-
tion (1953 ed.) and United States Patent Office, Index to Classification (1953).
25. 66 STAT. 798 (1952), 35 U.S.C.A. § 111 (Supp. 1953).
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judication in bankruptcy or a criminal conviction-the initial act which
opens the proceedings for the issuance of a patent controls, to a large
extent, the nature and the scope of the final disposition. Amendments
of the original patent application are permitted and are, in fact, the
normal occurrence. But the courts have been scrupulous in guarding
the interests of intervening inventors 2 6 and the evolution of the "file
wrapper" may be of decisive effect on the validity and interpretation
of a claim."
The new patent code, like the prior statute, contains a detailed
regulation of the form and substance of the patent application. It must
contain a specification of the invention as prescribed by the act, a draw-
ing, an oath to the effect that the applicant believes himself to be the
original and first inventor and the signature of the applicant.2 The
specification is the heart of the application. Its content and arrange-
ment are specifically prescribed by the statute 29 and the Rules of Prac-
tice in Patent Cases issued thereunder."0 Apart from the title and
a brief summary of the invention (required only by the Rules), the
specification must consist of two parts: (a) a detailed "description of
the invention, and of the manner and process of making and using it, in
such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled
in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected,
to make and use the same. . . ." and (b) "one or more claims partic-
ularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the
applicant regards as his invention." 1 In that respect American law
is in agreement with other patent laws, as for instance that of Ger-
many where the patent application comprises a petition for a patent,
an attached specification containing the detailed description, the patent
claim or claims and drawings.32
Decisional rules relating to the application of, and compliance with,
the comparatively simple and general statutory mandate have created
26. See especially the statements of the controlling policies in Schriber-Schroth
Co. v. Cleveland Trust Co., 305 U.S. 47, 57 (1938) (and authorities cited);
Marconi Wireless Telegraph Co. v. United States, 320 U.S. 1, 34 (1943) (and
authorities cited).
27. For illustrative examples of decisions turning on the "file wrapper history"
see, Schriber-Schroth Co. v. Cleveland Trust Co., 311 U.S. 211, 217 (1940) ; Exhibit
Supply Co. v. Ace Patents Corp., 315 U.S. 126 (1942).
28. 66 STAT. 798 (1952), 35 U.S.C.A. § 111 (Supp. 1953). In addition the Rules
of Practice in Patent Cases of the Patent Office require a petition or request for
patent. 37 CoDE FED. REs. §§ 1.51, 1.61 (1949 and Supp. 1952).
29. 66 STAT. 798 (1952), 35 U.S.C.A. § 112 (Supp. 1953).
30. 37 CODE FED. REas. §§ 1.77, 1.72, 1.73, 1.75, 1.76 (1949 and Supp. 1952).
31. 66 STAT. 798 (1952), 35 U.S.C.A. § 112 (Supp. 1953).
32. German Patent Act of 5 May 1936 (R.G.BL. § 26) ; Rules for Patent Appli-
cation, Law of 1 Oct. 1949 (R.G.BL 291). See 2 RErmER, PATENTGEsETZ UND
GESETZ BETREFFEND DEN SCHUTZ VON GE RAuC HsmUSTERN 746, 1249 (1949) (herein-
after REniER, PATENTGESETZ).
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a veritable maze of casuistry and semantic refinements regarding the
allowability of patent applications and the validity and interpretation
of patent grants." Unfortunately, these judicial and administrative
subtleties are far from being convincing as to their necessity, reason-
ableness and utility.34 Ariadne's thread leading out of this labyrinth
can perhaps be found: by reflecting on the basic functions of the descrip-
tive part of the specification 35 and of the claims. Reducing the subject
to the simplest denominators it can be said that the descriptive part of
the specification contains the disclosure for which the inventor is re-
warded with the patent 36 and which fixes the state of the prior art vis-
a-vis subsequent inventors,37 while the claims afford "the measure of
the grant" 38 and "define the boundaries of the monopoly" " especially
vis-a-vis potential infringers. Yet, although the description of the in-
vention and the claim are distinct in formulation and in purpose, it
must not be thought that there is no relevant interrelation between these
parts of the specification. Description and claims should "correspond"
33. For details see especially RIVISE AND CAESAR, PATENTABILITY AND VALIDITY,
351-453 (1936); STRINGHAM, PATENT CLAIMS: A DRAF.T'S MANUAL (2 vols.
193941); 2 WALxER, PATENTS 743 et seq., 769 et seq., 1204 et seq. (7th ed., Deller,
1937).
34. For recent voices of criticism, general or specific, mild or bitter, coming
from members of the patent bar see especially Kent, Patents De-Pending, 32 J.
PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 18 (1950) ; Broder, Impositive Elements, 32 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y
870 (1950); Kent, Revisal for Survival, 33 J. PAT. OFF. Sodx 127 (1951);
Broder, Peripatetic Preamble, 33 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 855 (1951); Zangwill, Com-
ments on Means Claims and Expressions, 34 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 36 (1952). Consult
also Coulter, The Field of Statutory Useful Arts, 34 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 417, 487,
718 (1952).
35. The descriptive part of the specification is frequently referred to as "specifi-
cation," but the statutory terminology makes the claims the concluding part of the
specification. 66 STAT. 798 (1952), 35 U.S.C.A. § 112 (Supp. 1953). In similar
fashion, the U.K. Patents Act, 1949, 12, 13 & 14 GEo. 6, c. 87, § 4(3) (c) provides
that "every complete specification shall end with a claim or claims defining the scope
of the invention claimed." Analogous provisions are contained in the new Australian
Patents Act, No. 42 of 1952, §40(b), [1952] AUSTR. COMMONWEALTH AcTs 135,
and the new South African Patents Act, No. 37 of 1952, §10(3)(c), [1952]
STATUTES OF THE UNION OF SOUTH AFRIcA 199. For a survey of the legal effect
of the claims on the patent protection in the United Kingdom and Australia, see
Dean, The Claiming Clauses of Patent Specifications, 4 REs JUDICATAE 144 (1949).
36. Universal Oil Products Co. v. Globe Oil & Refining Co., 322 U.S. 471, 484
(1944); Special Equipment Co. v. Coe, 324 U.S. 370, 378 (1945); Scott Paper
Co. v. Marcalus Mfg. Co., 326 U.S. 249, 255 (1945).
37. See particularly in this respect Alexander Milburn Co. v. Davis-Bournon-
yifle Co., 270 U.S. 390, 400, 401 (1926) ; General Electric Co. v. Wabash Appliance
Corp., 304 U.S. 364, 369 (1938) ; Marconi Wireless Telegraph Co. v. United States,
320 U.S. 1, 23 (1943).
38. Milcor Steel Co. v. George A. Fuller Co., 316 U.S. 143, 145, 146 (1942);
Universal Oil Products Co. v. Globe Oil & Refining Co., 322 U.S. 471, 484 (1944);
Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Products Co., 336 U.S. 271, 277 (1949).
39. Great A. & P. Tea Co. v. Supermarket Equipment Corp., 340 U.S. 147, 149
(1950). See also General Electric Co. v. Wabash Appliance Corp., 304 U.S. 364,
369 (1938) ; United Carbon Co. v. Binney & Smith Co., 317 U.S. 228, 232 (1942);
Marconi Wireless Telegraph Co. v. United States, 320 U.S. 1, 23 (1943).
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and "conform" to each other." If the disclosure is broader than the
claims, the unclaimed portion of the invention (unless recaptured by a
divisional application or a reissue application) is dedicated to the
public. 4 Conversely, if the claim is broader than the disclosed inven
tion it is invalid for "overclaiming." 42 Above all, in appropriate cases
where the validity or scope of allowed ' patent claims is in question, the
descriptive part of the specification may be resorted to in order to save
the claims from the vice of indefiniteness or excessiveness.
Unfortunately the question as to when and how far claims may
be aided by the descriptive part of the specification is not a simple mat-
ter. The accommodation of the conflicting interests of the inventor and
of the competitor accused of infringement in such cases involves com-
plex policy considerations, as was indicated in the previous section.
The Supreme Court has been cautious and hesitant in its approach.
To be sure, Chief Justice Stone once felt warranted to state flatly that:
"[t]he claims of a patent are always to be read or interpreted in the
light of its specification," " and opinions by some other Justices of the
Court contain similar sweeping expressions.45 But these dicta must
not be taken at their face value and must be contrasted with Justice
Jackson's observation: "The statute makes provision for specifications
separately from the claims. . . . It would accomplish little to require
that claims be separately written if they are not to be separately read.
4
1
Accordingly, the Supreme Court has been extremely reluctant to per-
mit a patentee to broaden a claim by reference to the specification with
the attendant result of infringement by an accused process, machine or
40. 37 CoDE FED. RExs. §§ 1.75(d), 1.117 (1949) (Rules of Practice in Patent
Cases).
41. "Nothing is better settled in the law of patents than that the patentee may
claim the whole or only a part of his invention, and that if he only describe and
claim a part, he is presumed to have abandoned the residue to the public." McClain
v. Ortmayer, 141 U.S. 419, 423-4 (1891).
42. Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Products Co., 336 U.S. 271, 277
(1949) (and authorities cited); Great A. & P. Tea Co. v. Supermarket Equipment
Corp., 340 U.S. 147, 150 (1950).
43. If the allowability of a claim is in issue the Patent Office and the courts
will justly insist on a stricter observance of the statutory standards with respect
to matters of draftsmanship and will reject claims which might be saved from
invalidity after the patent was granted. Application of Jolly, 172 F.2d 566, 569
(C.C.P.A. 1949); Application of Arbeit, 206 F.2d 947 (C.C.P.A. 1953). See also
1 STRINGHAM, PATENT CLAIMS: A DRAFTER's MANUAL 24 (1939).
44. Schriber-Schroth Co. v. Cleveland Trust Co., 311 U.S. 211, 217 (1940)
(Italics added).
45. Carnegie Steel Co. v. Cambria Iron Co., 185 U.S. 403, 432 (1902) (Brown,
J.); American Fruit Growers, Inc. v. Brogdex Co., 283 U.S. 1, 6 (1931)
(McReynolds, J.).
46. Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Products Co., 336 U.S. 271, 277
(1949).
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product.47  Similarly, the Court has been careful with respect to re-
strictive interpretation of claims where such limitation is based only
upon the specification. True, the Court has freely sanctioned the limi-
tation of claims otherwise too broad or indefinite by resort to the nar-
rower or more definite specifications in cases where the claims expressly
referred to the specifications by the magic formula "substantially as
described." 48 But the Court has no more than "assumed" the pro-
priety of such procedure in other cases of broadness or indefiniteness 4
and has clearly condemned it where the claims did not suffer from am-
biguity but were definitely overclaiming the invention." But even in
cases where resort to the descriptive part of the specification might
otherwise be permissive to narrow a claim, the patentee cannot succeed
if he is estopped by the Patent Office history of the claim.51
The Supreme Court has exhibited a high degree of sensitivity
against unduly comprehensive or indefinite claims and has invalidated
scores of patents on this ground"' except where greater definiteness
47. In McClain v. Ortmayer, 141 U.S. 419, 424 (1891), Mr. Justice Brown
wrote the much-quoted dictum: "The claim is the measure of [the patentee's] right
to relief, and while the specification may be referred to to limit the claim, it can
never be made available to expand it." (Italics added). It is suggested that "never"
means "hardly ever." At least Chief Justice Stone hinted in Smith v. Snow, 294
U.S. 1, 14 (1935), that the Court may condone the broadening of an ambiguous
claim in view of the description in order to "secure to the patentee his actual in-
vention." Actually the opinion refused to limit a broad, apparently valid claim merely
because of a certain selectiveness in the description. Subsequently, however, this
liberality of the Court backfired against the patentee, Smith v. Hall, 301 U.S. 216,
232 (1937).
48. See Westinghouse v. Boyden Power Brake Co., 170 U.S. 537, 558 (1898)
(and authorities cited).
49. General Electric Co. v. Wabash Appliance Corp., 304 U.S. 364, 373 (1938);
Schriber-Schroth Co. v. Cleveland Trust Co., 311 U.S. 211, 217-8 (1940); United
Carbon Co. v. Binney & Smith Co., 317 U.S. 228, 234 (1942).
50. Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Products Co., 336 U.S. 271, 277
(1949): "'While the cases more often have dealt with efforts to resort to specifica-
tions to expand claims, it is clear that the latter fail equally to perform their
function as a measure of the grant when they overclaim the invention. When they
do so to the point of invalidity and are free from ambiguity which might justify
resort to the specifications, we agree with the District Court that they are not to be
saved bdcause the latter are less inclusive."
51. Schriber-Schroth Co. v. Cleveland Trust Co., 311 U.S. 211, 217-21 (1940).
See also United Carbon Co. v. Binney & Smith Co., 317 U.S. 228, 236 (1942).
In the former case the Court held that where a feature found to be an essential
element of a patented combination-flexibility of a part-was mentioned in the
description but not in the claims, the claims could not be narrowed to contain this
limitation, after the applicant had expressly cancelled claims which contained said
feature as limitation.
52. See, e.g., Holland Furniture Co. v. Perkins Glue Co., 277 U.S. 245, 248
(1928) (product claims for starch glue "as good as animal glue") ; Standard Brands
Inc. v. National Grains Yeast Corp., 308 U.S. 34 (1939); General Electric Co. v.
Wabash Appliance Corp., 304 U.S. 364 (1938); United Carbon Co. v. Binney &
Smith Co., 317 U.S. 228 (1942); Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Co. v. Walker,
329 U.S. 1, 9 (1946); Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Products Co., 336
U.S. 271, 276 (1949); Great A. & P. Tea Co. v. Supermarket Equipment Corp.,
340 U.S. 147, 149 (1950).
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was not reasonably to be required.5" It has frowned especially upon
functional descriptions, at least where they are either wholly functional
or functional at the exact point of novelty.5 4  Probably as a reaction
against what seemed to be a dangerous trend and excessive formalism
the framers of the new code inserted a special paragraph in the sec-
tion dealing with the application designed to authorize within certain
limits the use of functional expressions in patent claims.' The para-
graph in question provides:
"An element in a claim for a combination may be expressed as a
means or step for performing a specified function without the
recital of structure or acts in support thereof, and such claims
shall be construed to cover the corresponding structure, material
or acts described in the specification or equivalents thereof."
Caution must be used not to overestimate the import of this au-
thorization. By its very terms the provision is restricted to functional
descriptions of an element in a claim for a combination. It does not
permit wholly functional claims for combinations, if that is conceivable;
and it is not applicable at all to claims for processes and, apparently, to
claims for compositions of matter. Moreover, it certainly does not dis-
pense with the necessity of "particularly pointing out and distinctly
claiming" " the subject matter of the purported invention. On the
other hand, "functionality" in claim drafting does not seem to be tabu
any longer, even though it relates to the "most crucial element in the
'new' combination" 5T or goes to "the precise point of novelty."' '
Two important recent adjudications have dealt with the new sec-
tion. In the first of them "' the Board of Appeals in the Patent Office
agreed "that some measure of greater liberality in the use of func-
tional expressions in the definition of elements in proper combination
53. Minerals Separation, Ltd. v. Hyde, 242 U.S. 261, 270 (1916).
54. Holland Furniture Co. v. Perkins Glue Co., 277 U.S. 245 (1928) (practically
wholly functional claim); General Electric Co. v. Wabash Appliance Corp., 304 U.S.
364, 371 (1938); Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Co. v. Walker, 329 U.S. 1, 9
(1946), explained in Faulkner v. Gibbs, 338 U.S. 267, 268 (1949).
55. 66 STAT. 798 (1952), 35 U.S.C.A. § 112, par. 3 (Supp. 1953). No such pro-
vision was inserted in the corresponding section of the original preliminary draft in
PROPOSED REVISION AND AMENDMENT OF THE PATENT LAWS, PRELIMINARY DRAr
WITH NOTES § 28 (Committee on the Judiciary, House of Representatives, Com-
mittee Print, 1950). It was, however, added to H.R. 3760, 82d Cong., 1st Sess.
§ 112 (1951). In the Revision Notes to § 112 the framers say tersely: "A new
paragraph relating to functional claims is added."
56. 66 STAT. 798 (1952), 35 U.S.C.A. § 112, par. 2 (Supp. 1953).
57. This was the vice of the claim involved in Halliburton Oil Well Cementing
Co. v. Walker, 329 US. 1, 9 (1946).
58. Cf. Faulkner v. Gibbs, 338 U.S. 267, 268 (1949); General Electric Co. v.
Wabash Appliance Corp., 304 U.S. 364, 371 (1938).
59. Ex parte Ball and Hair, 675 O.G. PAT. OFF. 5 (1953).
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claims is authorized by Section 112 than ha [d] been permitted by some
of the stricter decisions of the courts in the past." Of various claims
relating to the invention of a hydraulic system for operating a cable
reel, the Board upheld a number of them, although they employed
means expressions to "specify the novel structure" and to "charac-
terize the novel manner" of operating the same. On the other hand,
the Board rejected some other claims because the specified function
was "couched in such broad language as to ignore completely [a]
condition esgential to the practice of applicant's concept." It is worth
noting that the description in the specification apparently was drafted
in structural terms. In the second of these decisions,"° the Court of
Customs and Patent Appeals dealt with certain claims regarding a
novel glass tank furnace. The court upheld two claims *using func-
tional limitations, because these limitations had no "vital importance in
the matter of novelty," but refused to hold that certain other func-
tional claims were saved by the new Section 112. The court based the
decision with respect to the latter claims on the ground that their func-
tional description failed adequately to define the dimension of the ele-
ment although its dimension was "a vital structural element." 61
Since the descriptive part of the specification suffered from the identical
defect, the court found non-compliance with the statutory mandates of
paragraphs 1 and 2 of Section 112. As a result, it seems likely that the
courts will not be inclined to indulge in a "new functionalism."
American law traditionally has adhered to the so-called "inventor
principle," i.e., it has required that the applicant for patent be the in-
ventor. The new code has retained this system ' but it has alleviated
some of its rigors in cases of joint inventions, 3 death or incapacity
of the inventor 64 and certain other hardship situationsY Particularly
the recognition of these latter cases constitutes a real innovation of the
new code. The German law originally adhered to the "application
principle" "I but switched to the inventor principle in 19 36 .17  How-
ever, it still recognizes, in general, that the assignee of an invention
may file the application provided he names the inventor and specifies
60. Application of Arbeit, 206 F.2d 947 (C.C.P.A. 1953).
61. Id. at 955.
62. 66 STAT. 799 (1952), 35 U.S.C.A. § 115 (Supp. 1953).
63. 66 STAT. 799 (1952), 35 U.S.C.A. § 116 par. 2 (Supp. 1953).
64. 66 STAT. 799 (1952), 35 U.S.C.A. § 117 (Supp. 1953).
65. 66 STAT. 799 (1952), 35 U.S.C.A. § 118 (Supp. 1953).
66. See Osterrieth, Gerinan Patent Law and Patent Procedure, in PATENTS
AND GEBRAUCHSMUSTER in International Law 195, 198 (Stringham ed. 1935).
67. German Patent Act of 5 May 1936 (R.G.BL. § 3) ; 1 REimER, PATENTGESETZ
157 (1949).
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the manner in which he succeeded to the right to the patent.68  Gen-
erally speaking, German law resembles American law with respect
to the form, substance and effect of the patent application.69 The chief
difference lies in the fact that, in contrast to American law, where there
are competing inventors, priority is not accorded to the inventor who
first conceived the invention or reduced the same first to practice, but
to him who filed his application first.7"
Codifying and Clarifying Rules of Patent Office Practice
The new patent act codifies to a large extent existing rules for
proceedings in the Patent Office which that agency had previously de-
veloped under its statutory rule-making powers. 71  In addition, it
enacts some new provisions designed to clarify or modify certain as-
pects of Patent Office practice pertaining to either ex parte proceedings
or interferences. As not every purely formal revision is worth dis-
cussing, attention will be focused on five aspects of Patent Office prac-
tice subject to new regulation by the code, namely:
(1) differentiation of types of Patent Office action;
(2) limitation on permissible amendments;
(3) regulation of division requirements and involuntary divi-
sional applications;
(4) regulation of voluntary divisional applications;
(5) innovations in interferences.
1. Recognition of Different Types of Patent Office Action:-
The new act gives statutory sanction to the various types of official
action which the Patent Office had come to differentiate under its tra-
ditional practice.'2 Accordingly, the new act recognizes that the exam-
68. German Patent Act of 5 May 1936 (R.G.BL. §§ 3, 26 (6)).
69. German patent claims differ from the usual American forms in that they
customarily commence with a generic reference to the invention and then introduce
and specify the novel feature with the clause "characterized by," which may be
couched in functional terms. See 1 STRINGHAM, PATENT CLAiMs: A DRAWER's
MANUAL 986 (1941); 2 RmImER, PATENTGESETZ 765 (1950).
70. German Patent Act of 5 May 1936 (R.G.BL. § 3).
71. REv. STAT. §483 (1875), 35 U.S.C. §6 (1946); now 66 STAT. 793 (1952),
35 U.S.C.A. § 6 (Supp. 1953).
72. See, for instance, STRINGHAM, OUTLINE OF PATENT LAW AND GUIDE TO
DIGESTS 357 (1937) ; see also 37 CODE FED. REGs. §§ 1.106, 1.113, 1.181
(1949) (Rules of Practice in Patent Cases). The MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING
PRCEDURE §706.01 (1949), provides: "The refusal to grant claims because the
matter as claimed is unpatentable is called a 'rejection' . . . . If the form of the
claim (as distinguished from its substance) is improper, an 'objection' is made.
The practical difference between a rejection and an objection is that a rejection
involving the merits of the claim is subject to review by the Board of Appeals,
while an objection, if persisted in, may be reviewed only by way of petition to the
Commissioner."
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ination of the patent application may lead either to a rejection or to a
mere objection or requirement, prescribing that in any case the action
be accompanied by reasons.'3 This provision does not represent a
departure from the accepted state of affairs.
2. Prohibition of Amendments Introducing New Matter:-The
new statute prohibits explicitly any amendment which introduces new
matter into the disclosure of the invention.74 This rule likewise signi-
fies no change of the previous practice.75 It should not prevent in
meritorious cases an applicant from being permitted to make "explicit
what was already implicit." 71
3. Regulation of Division Requirements and Involuntary Di-
visional Applications:-American patent law, like German patent
law, 77 traditionally has adhered to the so-called "unity principle" which
permits one patent to be granted only for a "unity of inventions" and
accordingly prohibits the joinder of "separate and distinct" inventions
in one application. 7' Nevertheless, practical considerations have made
the joinder of "dependent and related" inventions desirable and per-
missible. In the celebrated case of Steinmetz v. Allen,7 the Supreme
Court reviewed extensively the state of the law in this respect and in-
validated a Patent Office rule which absolutely proscribed the joinder
of machine and process claims, machine and product claims, or prod-
uct and process claims. The decision was based on the reason that
"the statute gives the right to join inventions in one application in
cases where the inventions are related, and it cannot be denied by a
hard and fixed rule which prevents such joinder in all cases." 80 As a
result, the rules regarding joinder of inventions were revised so as to
authorize the applicant to join "several distinct inventions," where
they "are dependent upon each other and mutually contribute to pro-
duce a single result," 8" and to instruct the examiner to issue a "require-
ment for division" in cases of improper joinder.82 The new act pur-
ports to codify the existing practice and provides that "if two or more
independent and distinct inventions are claimed in one application the
73. 66 STAT. 801 (1952), 35 U.S.C.A. §132 (Supp. 1953).
74. Ibid.
7$. 37 CODE FE.D. REGS. § 1.118 (1949) (Rules of Practice in Patent Cases).
76. Marconi Wireless Telegraph Co. v. United States, 320 U.S. 1, 34 (1943).
77. Compare 2 REImER, PATENTGESErZ 770 (1950).
78. See the discussion of these concepts in Steinmetz v. Allen, 192 U.S. 543, 557
(1904).
79. 192 U.S. 543 (1904).
80. Id. at 561.
81. 37 CODE FED. Rras. § 1.141 (1949) (Rules of Practice in Patent Cases).
82. Id. § 1.142.
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Commissioner may require the application to be restricted to one of the
inventions." " It is submitted that the phraseology is unfortunate
since it could imply that the historic prohibition against the joinder of
independent and distinct inventions is now merely discretionary with
the Commissioner. At any rate, the new rules of practice flatly enjoin
the combination of claims for "independent and distinct inventions"
and direct a "requirement for restriction." "
In case of a "requirement for restriction," the applicant may make
the excluded invention the subject of a "divisional application," "
and if such application complies with the new provisions for divisional
applications,"6 it will be entitled to the filing date of the original appli-
cation, and will not be subject to a reference by virtue of a patent issued
upon the application with respect to which the requirement for restric-
tion was made.sT
4. Regulation of Voluntary Divisional or Continuation Applica-
tions:-The new act also adds 88 a statutory recognition and regulation
of the so-called "voluntary divisionals" or "continuation applica-
tions." "0 The development of the Patent Office practice in that respect
had been sanctioned by the courts long ago despite the absence of a
direct statutory authorization; "o but the extent of its permissibility had
caused considerable difficulties,"' and the latitude of the Supreme Court
in that respect had been questioned by a member of that tribunal,92
and followed only grudgingly by some lower courts.93
83. 66 STAT. 800 (1952), 35 U.S.C.A. § 121 (Supp. 1953) (Italics added).
84. 37 CoDE FFD. REos. §§ 1.141, 1.142 (Supp. 1952) (Rules of Practice in
Patent Cases).
85. 66 STAT. 800 (1952), 35 U.S.C.A. §121 (Supp. 1953).
86. 66 STAT. 800 (1952), 35 U.S.C.A. §120 (Supp. 1953).
87. 66 STAT. 800 (1952), 35 U.S.C.A. § 121 (Supp. 1953).
88. 66 STAT. 800 (1952), 35 U.S.C.A. §'120 (Supp. 1953).
89. The term "voluntary" divisional application is employed to signify that the
application is not the result of a requirement for restriction. The Supreme Court
has used the terms divisional application and continuation application interchangeably.
See Crown Cork & Seal Co. v. Ferdinand Gutmann Co., 304 U.S. 159, 170, 171
(1938) (dissenting opinion); General Talking Pictures Corp. v. Western Electric
Co., 304 U.S. 175, 183 (1938).
90. "While 'divisional' applications have never been expressly authorized by
statute the courts have long recognized their use as a part of Patent Office pro-
cedure." Black, J. (dissenting) in Crown Cork & Seal Co. v. Ferdinand Gutmann
Co., 304 U.S. 159, 170 (1938).
91. See Chapman v. Wintroath, 252 U.S. 126 (1920); Webster Electric Co. v.
Splitdorf Electrical Co., 264 U.S. 463 (1924) ; Crown Cork & Seal Co. v. Ferdinand
Gutmann Co., 304 U.S. 159 (1938); General Talking Pictures Corp. v. Western
Electric Co., 304 U.S. 175 (1938).
92. See the dissents by Justice Black in Crown Cork & Seal Co. v. Ferdinand
Gutmann Co., 304 U.S. 159, 168 (1938); General Talking Pictures Corp. v. Western
Electric Co., 304 U.S. 175, 183 (1938).
93. See, e.g., Hazeltine Research, Inc. v. General Motors Corp., 170 F.2d 6,
8 (6th Cir. 1948).
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The practice of allowing divisional applications originated appar-
ently as a result of the Patent Office rule requiring divisions where
applications contained different categories of claims.9 But the de-
vice was also found to be invaluable to secure for an applicant the
benefit of an invention which he had previously disclosed in an appli-
cation, but had failed to claim, and which he would otherwise have
abandoned to the public. 5  Moreover, it was a convenient method to
secure interferences with respect to the added claims." All these re-
sults flowed from the doctrine, at an early time sanctioned by the Su-
preme Court,9" that the divisional application was a continuation of
the original application and benefited from the earlier filing date, thus
aiding the inventor in priority disputes and refuting abandonment.
The chief problems regarding the allowability and validity of
divisional patents concerned the length of time which the inventor
could let pass with impunity before recapturing the disclosed inven-
tion. The Supreme Court refused to lay down a hard and fast rule,9 8
and held that "in the absence of intervening adverse rights for more
than [the period specified in Rev. Stat. 4886] " prior to the continua-
tion application, [the latter is] in time." 100
The new statute expressly authorizes a continuation application
with the benefit of the filing date of the original application if it (a) is
for a patent on an invention properly disclosed in the latter, (b) is
filed before the patenting or abandonment of, or termination of pro-
ceedings, on the first application or on an application similarly entitled
94. See the comments to that effect by Black, J. (dissenting) in Crown Cork
& Seal Co. v. Ferdinand Gutmann Co., 304 U.S. 159, 170-1 (1938).
95. ". . . [D]ivisional applications [have] not been dealt with in a hostile
spirit by the courts, but, on the contrary, designed as they are to secure the patent
to the first discoverer, they have been favored to the extent that where an invention
clearly disclosed in an application . . . is not claimed therein but is subsequently
claimed in another application, the original will be deemed a constructive reduction
of the invention to practice and the later one will be given the filing date of the
earlier, with all of its priority of right." Chapman v. Wintroath, 252 U.S. 126, 137
(1920). See also the general comments by Holmes, J. in Milburn Co. v. Davis-
Bournonville Co., 270 U.S. 390, 401-2 (1926). The recaptured invention may be an
unclaimed step in a patentable process, Crown Cork & Seal Co. v. Ferdinand Gut-
mann Co., 304 U.S. 159 (1938), or an unclaimed subcombination in a patentable
combination, Special Equipment Co. v. Coe, 324 U.S. 370 (1945).
96. Cf. Chapman v. Wintroath, 252 U.S. 126, 132 (1920); Webster Electric
Co. v. Splitdorf Electrical Co., 264 U.S. 463, 464 (1924) ; Crown Cork & Seal Co. v.
Ferdinand Gutmann Co., 304 U.S. 159, 161, and dissenting opinion 171, 174 (1938)
("divisional" on "divisional").
97. Smith & Griggs Mfg. Co. v. Sprague, 123 U.S. 249, 250 (1887).
98. Crown Cork & Seal Co. v. Ferdinand Gutmann Co., 304 U.S. 159, 167
(1938).
99. This period was two years at the time of the decisions, but subsequently
was cut down to one year. 53 STAr. 1212 (1939).
100. Crown Cork & Seal Co. v. Ferdinand Gutmann Co., 304 U.S. 159 (1938)
as explained in General Talking Pictures Corp. v. Western Electric Co., 304 U.S.
175, 183 (1938).
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to the benefit of the filing date of the first application, and (c) con-
tains or is amended to contain a specific reference to the original ap-
plication."' 1 The code thus adds the requirement of a specific refer-
ence in the continuation application to the parent application and re-
tains the requirements that the divisional application must read on
the disclosure of the parent application,' and that the disclosure must
be continuously before the Patent Office.113  Unfortunately, the statute
fails to establish any limitations with respect to intervening private or
public rights. Whether the previously recognized restrictions, how-
ever modest, are intended to be and will be preserved,, remains to be
seen. Such bar to excessive extensions of the patent monopoly seems
to be highly desirable, especially in view of the fact that the original
idea of the draftsmen to restrict the life of the divisional patent to the
unexpired term of the parent patent 104 did not come to fruition. 05
5. Implementing Determinations in Interference:-Proceedings
in the Patent Office of the United States are as a rule of the ex parte
type. Adversary proceedings between private contestants tradi-
tionally 106 are provided only for the purpose of determining the ques-
tion of priority between competing applicants, or between an applicant
and senior patentees-so-called interference proceedings. American
law thus stands in sharp contrast to the patent laws of other countries
which permit adversary proceedings in the Patent Office to a much
larger extent. In the United Kingdom, for example, elaborate provi-
sions are made for formal proceedings by which interested third par-
ties may, for specified grounds relating to the patentability of the pur-
ported invention, either oppose the grant of a patent, 0 7 or ask for its
revocation within twelve months after the sealing.' In Germany, the
law likewise authorizes formal opposition proceedings instituted by
101. 66 STAT. 800 (1952), 35 U.S.C.A. § 120 (Supp. 1953).
102. Webster Electric Co. v. Splitdorf Electrical Co., 264 U.S. 463, 465 (1924).
103. Crown Cork & Seal Co. v. Ferdinand Gutmann Co., 304 U.S. 159, 165
(1938).104. PROPOSED REVISION ANr AMENDMENT OF THE PATENT LAws, PRELIMINARY
DRAFT WITH NOTES §35 (Committee on the Judiciary, House of Representatives,
Committee Print, 1950).
105. The pertinent clause was not inserted into the corresponding section. H.R.
3760, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. § 120 (1951).
106. For the history of interference practice in American patent law see 1
WALKER, PATENTS 880 (7th ed., Deller, 1937). For a current description see Baker,
Outline of Patent Office Interference Practice, 36 3. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 30, 122, 185
(1954).
107. U.K. Patents Act, 1949, 12, 13 & 14 GEo. 6, c. 87 § 14. For the development
of the opposition practice in England see TERRELL AND SHELLEY, LAW OF PATENTS
167 (9th ed. 1951).
108. U.K. Patents Act, 1949, 12, 13 & 14 GEo. 6, c. 87 § 33; for so-called "belated
opposition" see TERRELL AND SHELLEY, LAW OF PATENTS 186 (9th ed. 1951).
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interested third parties,"0 9 and, in addition, provides for annulment
proceedings in the Patent Office which may be instituted by interested
third parties throughout the life of the patent."' The National Patent
Planning Commission recommended in its first and third report "..
that American patent law be amended to authorize cancellation pro-
ceedings instituted by interested parties in the Patent Office within six
months after the issuance of the patent. This recommendation, how-
ever, was not adopted by the framers of the new act.
The new statute retains substantially the provisions of the prior
law," but makes some additions designed to implement Patent Office
determination. The most important of them is the new rule which
specifies that a final determination in interference which is adverse to
a senior patentee shall constitute a cancellation of the claims involved.
The rule that prior patenting after one year constitutes a bar to a claim
by another for the same invention is, consonant with the prior law,
expressly extended to interference proceedings." 3 The details of the
interference practice are regulated by the Patent Office under its rule-
making powers in its Rules of Practice." 4 The enactment of the new
statute has not necessitated extensive revision of the subject.
Clarifying the Provisions for Judicial Review
Adverse decisions of the examiner in ex parte proceedings are
subject to administrative review by the Board of Appeals in the Pat-
ent Office." 5  Upon the institution and declaration of an interference,
jurisdiction over the inter partes proceedings is taken by the Board
of Patent Interferences "' whose decision is not reviewable by any
administrative appellate tribunal in the Office. In accordance with
the prior law, the new act contains elaborate provisions for judicial
review of the decisions of both the Board of Appeals and Board of
109. German Patent Act of 5 May 1936 (R.G. Br_ § 32) as revised by statute
of 22 July 1953. See 2 REImR, PATENTGESETZ 840 (1950).
110. German Patent Act of 5 May 1936 (R.G.Bi. §§ 13, 37) as revised by
statute of 22 July 1953. A former provision which limited the availability of annul-
ment proceedings to five years from the grant was eliminated from the act by amend-
ment of 1941. See 1 REIMER, PATENTGESETZ 569 (1950); 2 id. at 901 (1950).
111. The American Patent System, H.R. Misc. Doc. No. 239, 78th Cong., 1st
Sess. 3, 4 (1943); Third Report on the American Patent System, H.R. Misc. Doc.
No. 283, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1945).
112. 66 STAT. 801 (1952), 35 U.S.C.A. § 135 (Supp. 1952).
113. Id. par. 2.
114. 37 CODE FED. REGs. §§ 1.201-1.267 (1949 and Supp. 1952).
115.66 STAT. 801, 793 (1952), 35 U.S.C.A. §§ 133, 7 (Supp. 1953); 37 CODE
FEn. REs. §§ 1.191 et seq. (1949 and Supp. 1952) (Rules of Practice in Patent
Cases).
116. 66 STAT. 801 (1952), 35 U.S.C.A. §135 (Supp. 1953); 37 CODE FED.
REGs. § 1.211 (1949) (Rules of Practice in Patent Cases).
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Patent Interferences." 7  But, while the code has revised extensively
the sections which controlled previously,118 the changes concern mostly
formal details or matters of draftsmanship.
The provisions for judicial review of Patent Office decisions have
undergone a long and complex history which was recapitulated by Jus-
tice Roberts in great detail in his carefully considered opinion in the
case of Hoover v. Coe."9 The evolution culminated in 1927 in the
creation of an alternative system of review: either by appeal to the
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia or by bill in equity in
either the District Court of the District of Columbia or any other proper
federal district court. 2 With the transformation of the Court of
Customs Appeals into the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals in
1929 the appellate functions of the Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia were transferred to this new tribunal." The abolition
of the differentiation between actions at law and suits in equity by
the federal rules of civil procedure in 1938 finally changed the formal
characterization of the remedy in the district courts.
The new act retains the alternative system of judicial review by
either appeal to the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals ' or civil
action in the appropriate district court. 2 The chief difference be-
tween the two modes of judicial review is that review by the Court of
Customs and Patent Appeals is of summary character "on the evi-
dence produced before the Patent Office" 124 while the review by civil
action is de novo.'25 As under the previous law this difference in scope
of review has important consequences on the right to elect between the
two available methods of review. If the decision to be challenged is
that of the Board of Appeals, i.e., one terminating ex parte proceed-
117. 66 STAT. 801-2 (1952), 35 U.S.C.A. §§ 141-6 (Supp. 1953).
118. 35 U.S.C. §§ 59a-63 (1946).
119. 325 U.S. 79 (1945).
120. 44 STAT. 1335 (1927).
121. 45 STAT. 1475 (1929).
122. 66 STAT. 802 (1952), 35 U.S.C.A. §141 (Supp. 1953).
123. 66 STAT. 803 (1952), 35 U.S.C.A. §§ 145-6 (Supp. 1953).
124. 66 STAT. 803 (1952), 35 U.S.C.A. § 144 (Supp. 1953). See also Hoover
Co. v. Coe, 325 U.S. 79, 88 (1945) ("summary appeal").
125. Hoover Co. v. Coe, 325 U.S. 79, 83 (1945) (". . . trial . . . on proof
which may include evidence not presented in the Patent Office.") ; see also 66 STAT.
803 (1952), 35 U.S.C.A. § 146 (Supp. 1953), providing for the admission of the
record in the Patent Office "without prejudice to the right of the parties to take
further testimony." However, it is recognized that the admissibility of new evidence
requries that "there has been no suppression, bad faith or gross negligence on the
part of the party offering it." Shell Development Co. v. Pure Oil Co., 111 F. Supp.
197, 199 (D.D.C. 1953); Knutson v. Gallsworthy, 164 F.2d 497, 509 (D.C. Cir.
1947). Trial de novo likewise does not warrant that claims not considered by the
Patent Office may be litigated in the judicial proceedings. Gilbert v. Marzall, 182
F.2d 389 (D.C. Cir. 1950).
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ings, the dissatisfied applicant has the unqualified choice between an
appeal and review by civil action. Filing an appeal constitutes a
waiver of the right to the alternative mode of review." 6 Contraiwise,
if the decision to be challenged is that of the Board of Patent Inter-
ferences, i.e., the determination of a priority dispute between contest-
ing parties, the dissatisfied party can make the initial choice. If he
elects to appeal, however, any adverse party may insist on complete re-
view by civil action; in this event, appellant must dismiss the appeal
and may thereafter resort to the alternative remedy.'
2 7
The scope and the finality of these judicial determinations re-
viewing Patent Office action has produced much perplexity, doubt, and
outright confusion. Two comparatively recent Supreme Court deci-
sions, however, have shed some light upon the obscure matter. In
Hoover v. Coe the Court held that review by civil action was available
to an applicant against a rejection by the Board of Appeals of claims
"as not reading on the applicant's disclosure," "28 although in this case
a reversal by the district court of the Board's rejection did not deter-
mine the right of the applicant to receive a patent but merely implied
the direction that the claims should stand allowed for the purpose of
declaring an interference. In Sanford v. Kepner,'29 the Court decided
that if the district court in a civil action to review a determination of
priority by the Board of Patent Interferences finds against plaintiff on
the issue of priority no adjudication as to the patentability of the ad-
versary's claim is required, although such adjudication is necessary
before the court may authorize the Commissioner to issue a patent. It
should be noted that the reasoning in these cases contains language
which seems to clarify matters beyond the points actually decided. Of
particular significance in this connection is the recognition in the
Hoover case that the principle of res judicata does not prevent the
Patent Office from disallowing claims for want of novelty over a
newly discovered reference to the prior art even after the district court
has held in favor of the applicant.' 30 The same principle a fbrtiori
has been held to authorize the Patent Office to reject claims on the
ground of a newly discovered reference to prior art after the Court of
Customs and Patent Appeals had reversed a rejection on other refer-
ences.131
126. 66 STAT. 802 (1952), 35 U.S.C.A. § 141 (Supp. 1953).
127. 66 STAT. 802 (1952), 35 U.S.C.A. §142 (Supp. 1953).
128. 325 U.S. 79, 80 (1945).
129. 344 U.S. 13 (1952).
130. 325 U.S. 79, 89 (1945).
131. Jeffrey Mfg. Co. v. Kingsland, 179 F.2d 35 (D.C. Cir. 1949) (mandamus
in the District Court for the District of Columbia to compel the commissioner of
patents to issue a patent).
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This, however, does not signify that the decisions of the Court
of Customs and Patent Appeals or of the district courts in proceedings
for review of determintaions by the tribunals in the Patent Office, are
not res judicata against the party who sought review as to the matters
directly adjudicated or which could have been urged before the court.
Thus in Application of Prutton 132 the Court of Customs and Patent
Appeals held that where the district court in reviewing a decision by
the Board of Appeals affirmed a rejection based on anticipation, a sub-
sequent rejection of substantially identical claims on the ground of
res judicata was proper. The court stated, "Were we to hold other-
wise, we would nullify the decision of the Court of Appeals in the
earlier case. . . . Appellant having elected in the earlier case to pro-
ceed by civil suit under . . . [Rev. Stat.] § 4915, the final decision
rendered in that proceeding is conclusive of the issues determined
therein, and appellant cannot obtain a further review of such issues in
a later-filed application brought before this court." ' In view of the
reasoning in the Hoover case the reverse should also be true, and a re-
jection of claims on the ground of anticipation affirmed by the Court
of Customs and Patent Appeals should preclude a different decision
of the same issue by the district court."3 4 On the other hand, it has
been held that the doctrine of res judicata does not invalidate a patent
which the Patent Office granted on a second or divisional application
although substantially identical claims of the first or original applica-
tion had been rejected for want of patentable invention. 5  The same
result should follow even in cases where the prior rejection was affirmed
by a court on review. 36
The new act has not changed the above indicated principles as to
the scope and effect of the various types of judicial review. It has, how-
ever, separated the provisions regulating the civil action for review of
decisions by the Board of Appeals from those pertaining to the civil
action for review of decisions by the Board of Patent Interferences, and
has changed the language of the former so as to be more consonant
with the holding of the Hoover case.137  The famous question of
132. 204 F.2d 291 (C.C.P.A. 1953).
133. 204 F.2d 291, 296 (C.C.P.A. 1953). See also the companion case Applica-
tion of Prutton, 205 F.2d 198 (C.C.P.A. 1953).
134. Contra: Solomon v. Renstrom, 150 F.2d 805 (8th Cir. 1945) (apparently
misled by failure to observe the radical change in 1927).
135. Overland Motor Co. v Packard Motor Co., 274 U.S. 417, 421 (1927);
Keyes Fibre Co. v. Chaplin Corp., 97 F. Supp. 605 (D. Me. 1951).
136. The intimation in the case of Application of Prutton, 204 F.2d 291, 294
(C.C.P.A. 1953), to the effect that the doctrine of res judicata when applied to
Patent Office decisions is not as stringent as when applied to judicial decisions on
review thereof seems to be unfounded.
137. 66 STAT. 803 (1952), 35 U.S.C.A. § 145 (Supp. 1953).
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whether decisions of the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals have
remained unreviewable by the Supreme Court despite the express pro-
vision for review by writ of certiorari in the Judicial Code 138 is appar-
ently not materially affected by the new language. It may be signifi-
cant, however, that the former designation of the decision as "revi-
sion" and the former clause which expressly saved to any interested
party the right to contest the validity of a patent despite any decision
of the court have now been deleted." 9 It is, however, not likely that
the Supreme Court will abrogate its self-imposed restraint in the
matter.
Recasting the Law Controlling Modification of the Terms of the Patent
So long as his application is pending the inventor may, within set
limits, affect the scope of the forthcoming patent either by formal
amendment of the application or, in appropriate cases, by filing of a di-
visional application.'4 ° Even after the issuance of the patent the pat-
entee has still some powers over the terms and effects of the grant.
American law traditionally has differentiated two methods by
which a patentee may substantially modify the terms of the granted
patent, viz., by disclaimer and by surrender and reissue. The new act
has retained these two devices, but some important changes have been
made, especially in the disclaimer practice.
Curtailing the Necessity for and Utility of Disclaimers:-It was
early established in English 141 and American " patent law that if an
inventor obtained a patent for a claim or claims broader than his inven-
tion the patent was void in toto. This rule applied even in a case where
only one of several claims suffered from that vice and where the defect
of overclaiming did not consist in the inclusion of an element not novel
but in the excessive breadth of the asserted monopoly such as the claim
of a principle or function.
1 43
To alleviate the rigors of this rule an English statute of 1835 .4
authorized the patentee to enter ". . . a Disclaimer of any Part of
138. 28 U.S.C. § 1256 (Supp. 1950). For details see ROBERTSON AND KRXHAM,
JURISDIcTIoN OF THE SuPRI&E COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, 442 et seq. (Wolfson
and Kurland ed. 1951).
139. Compare 66 STAT. 802 (1952), 35 U.S.C.A. "§144 (Supp. 1953), uith 35
U.S.C. §62 (1946).
140. See text at note 88 supra.
141. Cf. HINDMARCH, A TREATISE OF THE LAW RELATING TO PATENT PRVILEGES
203 (1846).
142. Evan v. Eaton, 7 Wheat. 356, 430 (U.S. 1822); Woodcock v. Parker, 30
Fed. Cas. 491, 492, No. 17,971 (C.C.D. Mass. 1813); Moody v. Fiske, 17 Fed. Cas.
655, 657, No. 9,745 (C.C.D. Mass. 1820); Wyeth v. Stone, 30 Fed. Cas. 723, 727,
No. 18,107 (C.C.D. Mass. 1840).
143. O'Reilly v. Morse, 15 How. 62, 120 (U.S. 1853).
144. 5 & 6 Wn.. 4, c. 83, § 1 (1835).
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either the Title of the Invention or of the Specification . . . not being
such Disclaimer . . . as shall extend the exclusive Right granted by
the. . . Letters Patent. . ." American law followed suit in the addi-
tional Patent Act of 1837,' and the two pertinent sections of this stat-
ute have formed part of the law without substantial change ' 46 until the
passage of the new code. According to these former provisions a pat-
entee was empowered to save his patent from invalidity owing to over-
claiming if ". . . the invalid portion had been claimed 'through inad-
vertence, accident, or mistake, and without any fraudulent or deceptive
intention,' and was also disclaimed without 'unreasonable' neglect or
delay." ' Under the old practice it was not only permissible to dis-
claim a whole separate claim but it was also possible to disclaim a por-
tion of a claim for the purpose of narrowing it so long as the excision
deleted ". . . distinct and separable matter . . . without mutilating or
changing what is left standing.. ",148 A disclaimer was even
proper though not necessary if it referred only to the descriptive part
of the specification.' 49
The new statute "'o introduces some radical changes. It abolishes
the rule that without prompt disclaimer the existence of one invalid
claim renders the whole patent invalid. Instead, it saves the remaining
claims despite the invalidity of some claims if the defect of the latter is
not due to any deceptive intention. In addition, the new provision re-
stricts the availability of disclaimers to "complete claims." The result
of the modifications, of course, is to reduce greatly the practical utility
of disclaimers and to curtail the possibility of saving excessive claims
for meritorious inventions.
As a comparative comment it is perhaps interesting to note that
in Germany the development has proceeded in the opposite direction.
Until recently only renunciation of entire claims was permitted.' 5 ' The
new Patent Law Amendment Act of July 18, 1953, however, intro-
145. 5 STAT. 193 (§7), 194 (§9) (1837).
146. REv. STAT. §§4917, 4922 (1875), 35 U.S.C. §§65, 71 (1946).
147. Marconi Wireless Telegraph Co. v. United States, 320 U.S. 1, 57 (1943).
For recent applications and constructions of the controlling sections, see also, Ensten
v. Simon, Ascher & Co., 282 U.S. 445, 452 (1931); Altoona Publix Theatres, Inc.
v. American Tri-Ergon Corp., 294 U.S. 477, 490 (1935); Maytag Co. v. Hurley
Machine Co., 307 U.S. 243, 245 (1939); Milcor Steel Co. v. George A. Fuller
Co., 316 U.S. 143 (1942).
148. Milcor Steel Co. v. George A. Fuller Co., 316 U.S. 143, 147 (1942),
relying on Hailes v. Albany Stove Co., 123 U.S. 582, 587 (1887). See also the
catalogue of valid disclaimers in Altoona Publix Theatres, Inc. v. American Tri-
Ergon Corp., 294 U.S. 477, 490 (1935).
149. Carnegie Steel Co. v. Cambria Iron Co., 185 U.S. 403, 436 (1902).
150. 66 STAT. 809 (1952), 35 U.S.C.A. §253 (Supp. 1953).
151. Decision of the German Patent Office, Oct. 5th, 1953, 55 Gewerbl.
Rechtssch. u. Urheberr. 523 (1953).
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duced a special proceeding for the retroactive limitation of claims and
eliminated the requirement of the prior law which permitted only dis-
claimers of entire claims.152
Clarifying the Rules Regarding Surrender and Reissue:-The
other mode of securing a variation of the patent grant in American law
is by surrender and reissue. This practice originated with an early
incident, upheld by the Supreme Court,"~ and was soon thereafter ex-
pressly sanctioned by congressional legislation."5 4 Provisions relating
to reissue have remained part of the American patent law ever since,
but have undergone numerous changes. 5 Although the statute au-
thorized reissue only "[w]henever any patent is wholly or partly inop-
erative or invalid, by reason of a defective or insufficient specification,
or by reason of the patentee claiming as his own invention or discov-
ery more than he had a right to claim as new . . .," 1"6 the Supreme
Court, although at first grudgingly, sanctioned reissue patents for the
purpose of broadening or adding claims.157  The Court construed the
statute so as to surround the right to modify the patent with three im-
portant safeguards, viz., the requirements that (a) the new claims
must be for the same invention as disclosed in the surrendered pat-
ent, (b) the defect in the old claims was due to ". . . inadvertence,
accident, or mistake, without any fraudulent or deceptive intention
* . ." and (c) due diligence was exercised in discovering and reme-
dying the defect.""8 It was suggested in the early decisions 159 that in
the case of enlarged claims a delay of more than two years was unrea-
sonable in the absence of special circumstances in view of the analogy of
the then existing rule that public use for more than two years barred
the allowability of an original application. In a recent case the Su-
preme Court took a further step and held that even where the reissue
152. 5 Patent Amendment Law, July 18, 1953 (B.G.BL. pt. I, 615, §36a).
153. Grant v. Raymond, 6 Pet. 218 (U.S. 1832).
154. 4 STAT. 559 (§3) (1832).
155. For details see 2 WALKER, PATENTS 1341-4 (7th ed., Deller, 1937), or
the survey given by Justice McReynolds in Sontag Chain Stores Co. v. National
Nut Co. of Calif., 310 U.S. 281, 283, 284, 286 (1940). The section which controlled
prior to the new code was REv. STAT. §4916 (1875), as revised by 45 STAT. 732
(1928), 35 U.S.C. §64 (1946).
156. 35 U.S.C. §64 (1946).
157. See, for instance, Miller v. Brass Co., 104 U.S. 350 (1881) ; Mahn v.
Harwood, 112 U.S. 354 (1884); Wollensak v. Reiher, 115 U.S. 96 (1885) ; Topliff
v. Topliff, 145 U.S. 156 (1892); Corbin Cabinet Lock Co. v. Eagle Lock Co., 150
U.S. 38 (1893); Sontag Chain Stores Co. v. National Nut Co. of Calif., 310 U.S.
281 (1940); U.S. Industrial Chemicals, Inc. v. Carbide & Carbon Chemicals Corp.,
315 U.S. 668 (1942).
158. See especially U.S. Industrial Chemicals, Inc. v. Carbide & Carbon
Chemicals Corp., 315 U.S. 668, 670, 671 at text to n.3 and n.4 (1942).
159. Miller v. Brass Co., 104 U.S. 350, 352 (1881); Mahn v. Harwood, 112
U.S. 354, 363 (1884) ; Wollensak v. Reiher, 115 U.S. 96, 100 (1885).
1954]
746 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW'REVIEW [Vol. 102
patent was applied for within two years intervening rights would be
saved from an infringement action.160
The new statute"'6 is the logical culmination of this development.
It authorizes the reissues "[w]henever any patent is, through error
without any deceptive intention, deemed wholly or partly inoperative
or invalid, by reason of a defective specification or drawing, or by rea-
son of the patentee claiming more or less than he had a right to claim
in the patent . . .," '1 provided that the reissue patent is for the in-
vention disclosed in the original patent without introduction of new
matter. The new statute specifies expressly that the scope of the claims
cannot be enlarged, unless the reissue application is filed within
two years from the grant of the original patent,' and makes special
provision for the protection of intervening rights and interests."' It
is perhaps somewhat surprising that the time for an application for
reissue is still fixed at two years from the original patent, although the
purportedly "analogous" period of public use which bars an original
application has been reduced to one year ever since an amendment
passed in 1939.
STRENGTHENING THE JUDICIAL PROTECTION
OF THE PATENTEE
Defining Prohibited Invasions of the Patent Grant
In the previous instalment of this study it was noted that one
of the principal objectives of the framers of the new code was to
strengthen the protection of the patent rights and to check the cor-
rosion of the patent system which had set in as a result of certain de-
cisions of the Supreme Court. As a result, the new code has made
a careful revision of the sections dealing with infringement and the
remedies therefor.1
6 5
While the patent does not confer on the patentee the right himself
to make, use or vend his own invention, as such right arises under
the common law, it does add to such powers the right to restrain
others from manufacturing, selling or using that which he invented.
This analysis, which was developed by the Supreme Court "I in devia-
160. Sontag Chain Stores Co. v. National Nut Co. of Calif., 310 U.S. 281 (1940).
161. 66 STAT. 808 (1952), 35 U.S.C.A. §§251, 252 (Supp. 1953).
162. 66 STAT. 808 (1952), 35 U.S.C.A. §251 (Supp. 1953) (Italics added).
163. Id. par. 4.
164. 66 STAT. 809 (1952), 35 U.S.C.A. §252 par. 2 (Supp. 1953).
165. 66 STAT. 811-15 (1952), 35 U.S.C.A. §§271-93 (Supp. 1953).
166. See especially United States v. American Bell Telephone Co., 167 U.S. 224,
239 (1897) ; Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502,
510 (1917) ; Crown Die & Tool Co. v. Nye Tool & Machine Works, 261 U.S. 24, 35
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tion from the language of the old law, has now found confirmation by
the statutory terms.167  The grant of these exclusionary rights ac-
corded by the patent is subject to the patentee's disposition either by
total or partial assignment inclluding encumbrance or by concession
of immunities of greatly varying scope, called licenses. 68
An invasion of the patentee's exclusionary rights is a statutory
tort, known as infringement. As discussed before, the new code recog-
nizes two types of infringement, developed by case law beginning with
the second part of the last century, viz., direct infringement and con-
tributory infringement. 69 A direct infringer is one who either with-
out authority makes, uses or sells a patented invention within the
United States during the term of the patent 170 or actively induces in-
fringement.171  A contributory infringer, on the other hand, is one
who, without being technically an infringer, sells an article which con-
stitutes a material part of the invention, is not suitable for substantial
non-infringing use and which he knows to be especially made or es-
pecially adapted for use in an infringement of such patent. 72 The
reason for this unusual number of qualifications in the statutory defini-
tion of contributory infringement was the apprehensiveness of the man-
ufacturers that without these safeguards even the sale of ordinary mer-
chandise might expose them to liability for contributory infringement.
It has also been discussed in detail that the Supreme Court's recent
expansion of the misuse doctrine and the concomitant eclipse of the
doctrine of contributory infringement prompted the enactment of
special provisions curbing the scope of the former.'7 It is therefore
not necessary to dwell again on these matters.
It is, however, important to note that the new code has in no way
attempted to affect the principles according to which the presence or
absence of an infringement is determined. Without attempting an ex-
haustive classification, it may be said that, generally speaking, in-
(1923); Special Equipment Co. v. Coe, 324 U.S. 370, 378 (1945). The starting
point of this distinction between common law rights and statutory rights of the
inventor is the famous dictum by Chief Justice Taney in Bloomer v. McQuewan,
14 How. 539, 548 (U.S. 1852): "The franchise which the patent grants, consists
altogether in the right to exclude every one from making, using, or vending the thing
patented, without the permission of the patentee. This is all that he obtains by the
patent."
167. Riesenfeld, The New United States Patent Act in the Light of Comparative
Law I, 102 U. OF PA. L. REv. 291, 10 (1954).
168. Id. at 310-13.
169. Id. at 314.
170. 66 STAT. 811 (1952), 35 U.S.C.A. §271(a) (Supp. 1953).
171. Id. §271(b).
172. Id. § 2 71(c). The statement in the text simplifies the overly complex
statutory definition. Cf. Rich, Infringenent Under Section 271 of the Patent Act
of 1952, 35 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 476, especially 493, 494 (1953).
173. Riesenfeld, supra note 167, at 314.
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fringenent cases involve three categories of disputes. In the first class
the patentee and the purported infringer have had no dealing with
regard to the practice of the invention and the question to be determined
is whether the accused device, process or product is covered by the
patented invention. In the second class the patentee had authorized
the accused party to utilize the invention in some fashion and the
question to be determined is whether the challenged practice exceeds
the limits of the license. In the third class there was likewise the grant
of a license, but the dispute involves not its limits, but its continued
subsistence. Only the first two classes of cases normally involve re-
sort to special principles of patent law.
While it is a recognized rule of American patent law that the
claims measure the grant,' 4 the courts have not determined the pres-
ence or absence of an infringement by reliance on rigid technicalities,
but by resort to considerations of fairness and social policy. Although
the public has a rcognized " vital interest in that an inventor cannot
preempt the whole field in which his invention lies, the courts have
been disposed to liberality of varying degree in his favor. 7 The basic
rule declares infringement to be committed whenever the patented and
the accused device, process or product perform substantially the same
function in substantially the same manner.7 Variations in details are
irrelevant so long as the invention and the accused imitation are
patentably equivalent. But, as Justice Jackson has lucidly expounded,
"equivalence, in the patent law, is not the prisoner of a formula and
is not an absolute to be considered in a vacuum." 178 The scope of the
liberality inherent in this doctrine of equivalents, which is said to have
originated in the case of Winans v. Denmead,'7  will vary according
to the merits of the invention, i.e., the technological progress achieved
thereby. Thus in the field of pioneer or near-pioneer patents greater
range will be given to the reach of the claims than in the case of a
174. See text at note 38 supra.
175. The courts are the self-appointed guardians of the public interest which
is "so frequently present but so seldom adequately represented in patent litigation,"
Muncie Gear Co. v. Outboard Co., 315 U.S. 759, 768 (1942) (per Justice
Jackson).
176. Thus the court itself has given the following summary of its policy con-
siderations: "This court has never modified . . . [its view] of the relative impor-
tance of the public and private interests involved in every grant of a patent, even
while declaring that in the construction of patents and the patent laws, inventor shall
be fairly, even liberally, treated." Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film
Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502, 511 (1917) (per Justice Clark).
177. Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Products Co., 339 U.S. 605, 608
(1950), with an illuminating survey of the controlling authorities by Justice
Jackson.
178. Id. at 609.
179. 15 How. 330 (U.S. 1853).
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patent in a crowded art. 8 ° Conversely, the doctrine may even defeat
protection if the accused device, process or product embodies substan-
tial functional deviations."' Of course, the doctrine does not operate
in disregard .of the Patent Office history of the claim. File wrapper
estoppel will bar the reliance on equivalents specifically excluded by
amendment or disclaimer.
1 82
It is hardly a surprise to find that other patent systems have de-
veloped similar ideas regarding the scope of protection. Thus the
German Supreme Court has developed a notion of "equivalence in the
patent law sense" which embodies policy considerations identical with
those underlying the American adjudications.'
The second class of infringement controversies mentioned above,
i.e., that which comprises disputes about alleged transgressions of li-
censes, involves questions which, without sharp demarcation, range
from comparatively simple problems turning on the reasonable scope
of a granted immunity to major policy issues concerning the extent to
which the patent system may be used to control competition. On the
lower end of the scale are the cases which establish the line dividing
mere repairs and replacements of quickly worn-out or consumed parts,
as are implied in a use-license, from reconstruction or substitution
which require a license to manufacture. 8 4  On the opposite end, are
the cases dealing with the validity of express limitations, especially
price-fixing and tying clauses. These have been discussed at length
before."1
Finally, in the third class of infringement cases, the invasion of
the patent right is predicated upon the prior violation and rescission of
an assignment or a license under which the accused practice is claimed
180. For statements and applications of this rule see particularly Westinghouse
v. Boyden Power Brake Co., 170 U.S. 537, 561, 562, 568 (1898) ; Ciniotti Unhairing
Co. v. American Fur Refining Co., 198 U.S. 399, 406 (1905); Eibel Process Co. v.
Minnesota & Ontario Paper Co., 261 U.S. 45, 63, 69 (1923); Mackay Radio &
Telegraph Co. v. Radio Corp. of America, 306 U.S. 86, 94 (1939); Universal Oil
Products Co. v. Globe Oil & Refining Co., 322 U.S. 471, 485 (1944); Graver Tank
& Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Products Co., 339 U.S. 605, 608 (1950).
181. Westinghouse v. Boyder. Power Brake Co., 170 U.S. 537, 568 (1898).
182. See, particularly, Altoona Publix Theatres, Inc. v. American Tri-Ergon
Corp., 294 U.S. 477, 492 (1935) ; Schriber-Schroth Co. v. Cleveland Trust Co., 311
U.S. 211, 220, 221 (1940) ; Exhibit Supply Co. v. Ace Patents Corp., 315 U.S. 126,
137 (1942).
183. For details see 1 REImER, PATENTGESETZ 77-81, 261, 262 (1949).
184. Wilson v. Simpson, 9 How. 109 (U.S. 1850); Morgan Envelope Co. v.
Albany Perforated Wrapping Paper Co., 152 U.S. 425 (1894); Heyer Duplicator
Co. v. Duplicator Mfg. Co., 263 U.S. 100 (1923). See also Leads & Catlin Co. v.
Victor Talking Machine Co. (No. 2), 213 U.S. 325 (1909) and the explanations
thereof in Carbice Corp. of America v. American Patents Development Corp., 283
U.S. 27, 34 (1931); Lincoln Engineering Co. v. Stewart-Warner Corp., 303 U.S.
545, 552 (1938); Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Investment Co., 320 U.S. 661,
668 (1944).
185. Riesenfeld, .npra note 167, at 315-7.
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to be performed. 8" Ordinarily, this type of controversy hinges on the
application of contract principles as developed by state law. Of course,
this statement does not signify that the validity and enforceability of
licenses is exclusively regulated by state law. It merely means that
where the patentee himself invokes the lapse of a license or assignment
for the purpose of bringing an infringement suit, normally only state
law is involved. Conversely, if the patentee stands on his license the
other party may resort to federal patent law principles in order to
defeat the license. Thus a license agreement may be void in toto as a
matter of patent law because of misuse of the patent monopoly,s' es-
pecially if it contains tying clauses or forms part of a prohibited price-
fixing scheme . 8  Moreover, where the price-fixing agreement is in-
valid only in the absence of a valid patent, the licensee may as a matter
of federal law assert the invalidity of the patent, in order to defeat
the whole license, although ordinarily a patentee is estopped from
questioning the validity of a patent. 8 '
Moreover, the statement that the enforceability of rights under
a license depends ordinarily on state contracts rules does not imply
that a state is barred from protecting the rights of a licensor on
principles of tort law. Apparently interference by a third party with
the relation between patentee and licensee may constitute a tort under
state law, although the proscribed acts do not amount to technical
contributory infringement."'°
186. See, for example, Wilson v. Sanford, 10 How. 99 (U.S. 1850); Hartell
v. Tilghman, 99 U.S. 547 (1878); White v. Rankin, 144 U.S. 628 (1892); Healy
v. Sea Gull Specialty Co., 237 U.S. 479 (1915); Luckett v. Delpark, Inc., 270 U.S.
496 (1926).
187. Cf. Automatic Radio Mfg. Co. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 339 U.S. 827
(1950). In this case the license agreement in issue was held to be valid despite the
fact that royalties were to be computed on the basis of the total volume of licensee's
sales regardless of the volume of sales of the patented articles.
188. The Supreme Court apparently still permits the enforcement of resale price
maintenance clauses in licenses to manufacture and sell, provided the patentee has
not combined with other patent holders in an industry-wide price-fixing scheme.
Cf. United States v. Line Material Co., 333 U.S. 287, 311 (1948) ; United States v.
New Wrinkle, Inc., 342 U.S. 371, 378 (1952). See also, McGregor v. Westinghouse
Electric and Mfg. Co., 329 U.S. 402, 408 (1947).
189. Sola Electric Co. v. Jefferson Co., 317 U.S. 173 (1942); Katzinger Co. v.
Chicago Metallic Mfg. Co., 329 U.S. 394 (1947); McGregor v. Westinghouse
Electric and Mfg. Co., 329 U.S. 402 (1947). Similarly, as a matter of federal law,
an assignee is not estopped from asserting the invalidity of the patent, if the defect
is due to anticipation by an expired prior patent. Scott Paper Co. v. Marcalus Co.,
326 U.S. 249 (1945).
190. Cf. Geneva Furniture Mfg. Co. v. S. Karpen & Bros., 238 U.S. 254, 257
(1915) in which the Court held that a cause of action charging defendants "with
wrongfully procuring . . . licensees to violate their license contracts in designated
particulars, some of which have no bearing on the charge of infringement" was not
a case arising under the patent laws for the purpose of federal jurisdiction. See
also Independent Wireless Tel. Co. v. Radio Corp. of America, 269 U.S. 459, 466
(1926), in which Chief Justice Taft recognized "that there is a tendency in courts
of equity to enjoin the violation of contract rights which are invaded by strangers
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The question of how far state law may go in aiding the inventor
on tort or equity principles over and above the protection accorded by
the patent law is a very complex matter which involves difficult policy
considerations. The case law cannot be reduced to a simple formula.,91
At any rate, the enactment of the new patent code has not materially
affected the problem.
Modernizing the Procedural Provisions in
Matters of Infringement and Interference
The previous patent law contained a number of rather awkvard
sections relating to the relief available in infringement and interference
cases and to matters of pleading and proof in such proceedings.'92
The provisions in question reflected the tenacity of the old forms of
action and were predicated on the separation between law and equity.
The adoption of the federal rules of civil procedure and the enactment
of the Revised Judicial Code made much of the former statutory lan-
guage obsolete or superfluous. The new act has properly taken account
of the new system of practice and brought the controlling provisions
in harmony with it.
in a direct action by the party injured, instead of compelling a roundabout resort to
a remedy through the covenant, express or implied, of the other contracting party,"
but indicated that such a suit was not one under the patent laws.
191. There seems to be ample authority for the proposition that state law on
principles of contract law, tort law or equity may and will protect an inventor
against a party who, in breach of an agreement or confidential relationship, has
appropriated the invention which was not publicly disclosed and has practiced the
same for his own gain. See Note, Protection and Use of Trade Secrets, 64 HARV.
L. REv. 976 (1951), and cases collected in Notes, 167 A.L.R. 1114, 1145-51
(1947), and 170 A.L.R. 449-500 (1947). Difficulties, however, exist with respect
to the proper type of state relief, where the wrongful appropriator has applied for,
or obtained, a patent. In the leading case of Becher v. Contoure Laboratories, Inc.,
279 U.S. 388, 391 (1929), the Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Holmes, held
that a state court had jurisdiction to entertain a suit for impressing a trust ex
maleficio on a patent obtained in a breach of a confidential relationship, but left it
undecided whether or not this attempt to get the assignment of the patent, not is-
sued to the true inventor, was made "mistakenly." Moreover, in a prior adjudica-
tion in a diversity case the Court had held that equity would not enforce a contract
for the assignment of a patent where the same was fraudulently secured to one not
being the true inventor, because such patent was invalid. Kennedy v. Hazelton, 128
U.S. 667 (1888). The attempt to reconcile and implement these two cases seems
to have created a hopeless muddle. See, e.g., Jones v. Ulrich, 342 Ill. App. 16, 95
N.E.2d 113 (1950) ; Young Spring & Wire Corp. v. Falls, 293 Mich. 602, 292 N.W.
498 (1940) ; Harrington v. National Outdoor Advertising Co., 355 Mo. 524, 196
S.W.2d 786 (1946); Coleman v. Whisnant, 225 N.C. 494, 35 S.E2d 647 (1945);
Mayer v. Hochman, 98 N.Y.S.2d 724 (Sup. Ct. 1950). In Grob v. Continental
Machine Specialties, Inc., 204 Minn. 459, 283 N.W. 774 (1939) the court refused to
entertain a damage action brought by an applicant for a patent against interfering ap-
plicants alleged to have filed their application maliciously, for the reason that the
Patent Office had primary jurisdiction. According to German law an inventor whose
invention has been illegally appropriated by another may file an opposition to a
patent application of the appropriator or obtain cancellation of a patent thus issued.
German Patent Act of 5 May 1936 (R.G.BL. pt. II, 117, §§4(3), 13(1)3).
192. 35 U.S.C. §§67-72 (1946).
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Type and Measure of Relief:-The code provides for two cate-
gories of civil actions by a patentee: one for relief in cases of infringe-
ment,'93 the other for relief in cases of interfering patents. 9
The relief made available in infringement cases consists of an award
of damages ' and, where appropriate, an injunction restraining the
violation of any right secured by the patent. 96 The statute entitles
the patentee to ". . . damages adequate to compensate for the in-
fringement, but in no event less than a reasonable royalty for the use
made of the invention by the infringer. . . ., 117 While the act
makes no special provision for an accounting, it seems to be certain
that the accepted rules regarding the right to an accounting and the
computation of damages are preserved. 9 ' Punitive damages are like-
wise still authorized. 9
The relief against an invalid interfering patent consists in a
declaration of the invalidity thereof.2  Such declaration should not
authorize a formal cancellation by the Patent Office, as paragraph 1
of Section 135 seems to be inapplicable."'
Scope of Adjudication:-In both types of proceedings, the validity
of the patents involved is subject to judicial determination, and any
ground of invalidity, whether relating to the patentability of the pur-
ported invention or to the scope and definiteness of the claims, may be
raised.2 "2 Because of the public interest in the freedom from invalid
patents, the Supreme Court has taken the position that in infringe-
193. 66 STAT. 812-13 (1952), 35 U.S.C.A. §§281-89 (Supp. 1953).
194. 66 STAT. 814 (1952), 35 U.S.C.A. § 291 (Supp. 1953).
195. 66 STAT. 813 (1952), 35 U.S.C.A. §284 (Supp. 1953).
196. 66 STAT. 812 (1952), 35 U.S.C.A. §283 (Supp. 1953).
197.66 STAT. 813 (1952), 35 U.S.C.A. §284 (Supp. 1953).
198. See especially Duplate Corp. v. Triplex Safety Glass Co., 298 U.S. 448
(1936). The statement in the text is buttressed by the fact that 28 U.S.C. § 1292(4)
(Supp. 1952) specifically recognizes the right to an accounting in patent infringe-
ment actions and the fact that the new code has not provided for a repeal thereof.
For the history of the above mentioned section see McCullough v. Kammerer Corp.,
331 U.S. 96 (1947).
199. 66 STAT. 813 (1952), 35 U.S.C.A. §284, par. 2 (Supp. 1953).
200. 66 STAT. 814 (1952), 35 U.S.C.A. §291 (Supp. 1953).
201. 66 STAT. 801 (1952), 35 U.S.C.A. § 135, par. 1 (Supp. 1953) provides: "A
final judgment adverse to a patentee from which no appeal or other review has been.
or can be taken or had shall constitute cancellation of the claims involved from the
patent, and notice thereof shall be endorsed on copies of the patent. . . ." Ap-
parently this provision applies only to interference proceedings initiated before the
Board of Patent Interferences and not to court proceedings instituted by a patentee
under § 291. It is not even clear whether the provision in question applies not only
to adverse decisions by the Board itself, but also includes adverse judgments rendered
on appeal or review de novo. The legislative history of the section seems to speak
for the broader construction. See PRoPosED REviSION AND AMENDMENT OF THE
PATENT LAWS, PRELIMINARY DRAFT WITH NOTES 33 (Committee on the Judiciary,
House of Representatives, Committee Print, 1950). The comment in the Revision
Notes to H.R. 1923, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. § 135 (1952) is obscure.
202. 66 STAT. 812, 814 (1952), 35 U.S.C.A. §§282, 291 (Supp. 1953).
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ment cases the question of whether the patent as granted is infringed
is of lesser public importance than that of whether the patent in issue
is valid. Accordingly, it has declared it to be the better practice first to
inquire into the second question.2 ~ It would seem that the same rule
should apply in equity suits initiated to resolve the conflict between
interfering patents. The contrary rule of Sanford v. Kepner, which
prevents an applicant who loses on the issue of priority in an inter-
ference action under Section 146 from challenging the patentability
of the patented invention of the victorious party,204 ought not to be ex-
tended to the proceedings under Section 291 in view of the express
statutory language,205 its legislative history 206 and, above all, the in-
terest of the party who loses on the issue of priority to be at least free
from the hazard of infringement.
The new statute has not provided for any right of the Com-
missioner of Patents to intervene in an infringement suit in which the
validity of the patent is in issue, although that right has been accorded
to him with respect to interference actions'07 This leaves the possi-
bility of a conflict between the Patent Office and the courts unmitigated,
despite the recommendations by the National Patent Planning Com-
mission in its first report that the courts should not be left to decide the
question without advice by the Patent Office.208 In Germany, the Pat-
ent Office has exclusive jurisdiction to annul patents. 9
Parties to and Effect of Adjudications in Infringement Litiga-
tion .:-The always intricate twin subjects of "parties" and "binding
effect of adjudications" are particularly troublesome in the field of
patent litigation. The factual complexities of the subject, the prev-
alence of a strong public interest in the elimination of invalid
203. Sinclair & Carroll Co. v. Interchemical Corp., 325 U.S. 327, 330 (1945).
204. See text at note 129 supra.
205. 66 STAT. 814 (1952), 35 U.S.C.A. § 291 (Supp. 1953): . . . the court may
adjudge the question of the validity of any of the interfering patents ... " (Italics
added).
206. An amendment of 1927 expressly modified REv. STAT. § 4918, the prede-
cessor of § 291, so as to draw within the purview of the adjudication the invalidity
of any of the interfering patents "upon any ground," 44 STAT. 1337 (1927) (Italics
added). No change was intended by the framers of the new act.
207. 66 STAT. 814 (1952), 35 U.S.C.A. § 291 (Supp. 1953) in conjunction with
66 STAT. 803 (1952), 35 U.S.C.A. § 146, par. 2 (Supp. 1953).
208. The American Patent System, HousE Misc. Doc. No. 239, 78th Cong., 1st
Sess. 6 (1943).
209. German Patent Act of 5 May 1936 (R.G. BL. §§ 13, 37). Cf. REIMER,
PATENTGESETZ 569 et seq., 901 et seq. (1949, 1950). If the defendant in an infringe-
ment action pending against him before the ordinary courts challenges the validity of
the patent the proceedings may be stayed to give him- the opportunity to institute
annulment proceedings in the Patent Office. Id. at 594, 1053. Annulment by the
Patent Office operates in rein, S.G. w. Allgem. Elektrizitdits-Gesellsch., German Su-
preme Court, Nov. 5, 1904, 59 Entscheidungen des Reichsgerichts in Zivilsachen
134.
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patents"21 and the effects of particularities in statutory language,211 all
have contributed to muddy the waters. The new statute, however, has
at least swept away many of the terminological obstacles.
As has been discussed before, 12 the statute accords the right to
sue for infringement to the patentee, i.e., to the recipient of the grant
or his "successors" in title.2 "1 Licensees as such are not mentioned;
but it is safe to assume that an exclusive licensee may bring action as
under the prior law, if he makes the patent owner a party.2 14 Con-
versely, the patent owner who has granted an exclusive license can
and should join the licensee as a necessary party in an action against
a third party infringer, 15 and apparenly the exclusive licensee is en-
titled to intervene as a matter of right.2 18 On the other hand, if a party
threatened with an infringement suit by an exclusive licensee wishes
to get relief in the form of a declaratory judgment action, joinder of
the patentee as indispensable party does not seem to be required.
21
Special considerations apply when infringement is claimed to have
been committed by a manufacturer and his customers. Ordinarily
every one of these infringers is individually liable and subject to
separate civil action. 18 But if the patentee has sued the manufacturer
without having brought action against the customers, a judgment
against the manufacturer decreeing an accounting of all profits and full
damages resulting from the sales of the infringing articles will bar
subsequent actions against the purchasers of such articles; 219 similarly
210. See the emphasis on this factor in Developments in the Law-Res J.udicata,
65 HARv. L. REv. 818, 883 (1952).
211. See the stress on that factor in Independent Wireless Tel. Co. v. Radio
Corp. of America, 269 U.S. 459, 464, 466 (1926).
212. Riesenfeld, supra note 167, at 313.
213. 66 STAT. 812, 797 (1952), 35 U.S.C.A. §§281, 100(d) (Supp. 1953).
214. Riesenfeld, supra note 167, at 313.
215. Arey v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 11 F.R.D. 209 (N.D. Ohio 1951).
But see Birdsell v. Shaliol, 112 U.S. 485 (1884) (involving action for nominal
damages by patentee brought without joinder of exclusive licensee).
216. Innis, Speiden & Co. v. Food Machinery Corp., 2 F.R.D. 261 (Del. 1942).
217. A. Belanger & Sons, Inc. v. Brisk Waterproofing Co., 116 F. Supp. 127
(D. Mass. 1953), relying on A. L. Smith Iron Co. v. Dickson, 141 F.2d 3, 6 (2d Cir.
1944) ; Hook v. Hook & Ackerman, Inc., 187 F.2d 52 (3d Cir. 1951) ; and United
Lacquer Mfg. Corp. v. Maas & Waldstein Co., 111 F. Supp. 139 (D.N.J. 1953). But
the last two of these cases are not in point, involving partial assignees rather than
exclusive licensees, while conversely in the Dickson case it is not clear whether the
defendant licensee was any more than a bare licensee. For a general dicussion of the
protection of an accused infringer under the declaratory judgment procedure see
Soffer, .Justiciable Controversy Under the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act and
the Exercise of Patent Rights, 22 GEo. WAsH. L. REv. 63 (1953), 36 J. PAT. OFF.
Soc'y 168 (1954).
218. See Yale & Towne Mfg. Co. v. Manning, Maxwell & Moore, Inc., 91
F. Supp. 106, 108 (S.D.N.V. 1950) (and authorities cited).
219. Wagner Sign Service, Inc. v. Midwest News Reel Theatres, Inc., 119
F.2d 929 (7th Cir. 1941). If the damages are not fully compensatory, however,
subsequent actions against the infringing customers are still possible, Birdsell v.
Shaliol, 112 U.S. 485 (1884); Union Tool Co. v. Wilson, 259 U.S. 107 (1922).
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the customers are apparently entitled to plead the judgment of a prior
action against the manufacturer, holding the patent to be invalid or not
to have been infringed, as a bar against subsequent infringement ac-
tions."' A manufacturer may intervene as a matter of permission in
an infringement action against his customer; but, if he wishes to inject
a counterclaim enlarging the subject of the litigation, the courts may
either reject the intervention or limit its scope.221 The procedural de-
vices of joinder, intervention and suit for declaratory judgment have
produced complicated situations of multiple litigation. The courts,
however, possess ample powers and discretion to achieve a "comprehen-
sive disposition of litigation" 2 and to curb the ill effects of "forum
shopping with a vengeance. '' 23
Simultaneous or seriatim attacks against the same patent in sep-
arate interference proceedings or separate infringement suits may, in-
evitably, result in inconsistent holdings as to validity because of the
"accepted limitations of the doctrine of res judicata." "4 Cancellation
of a patent by court decree or action by the government, however, is
possible only under special contingencies, such as fraud or deceit.2
Whether the administrative cancellation introduced by paragraph 1 of
Section 135 of the new code 2 is meant to have in rem effect is,
in the opinion of the writer, an open problem.
Jurisdiction Over Controversies Involving Patents:-The patent
act carefully refrains from any general regulation of jurisdiction over
controversies involving patents and contains only one special venue
provision.2 Such jurisdiction therefore is controlled by the Revised
Judicial Code which confers upon the district courts exclusive original
"jurisdiction of any civil action arising under any Act of Congress re-
lating to patents. . ' .22" The distribution of jurisdiction between
220. See Kerotest Mfg. Co. v. C-O-Two Fire Equipment Co., 342 U.S. 180, 185,
186 (1952). The court relied on Kessler v. Eldred, 206 U.S. 285 (1907). But that
decision merely held that a victorious manufacturer could enjoin subsequent suits
by the patentee against his customers and left the effect of the judgment on the cus-
tomer undecided.
221. See the detailed discussion of the question in 4 MooRE, FnEDER PCrcnCE
126 et seq., especially 135 (2d ed. 1950) ; for case law see Johnson v. Georgia Power
Co., 2 F.R.D. 282 (N.D. Ga. 1942); Finck v. Gilman Bros. Co., 11 F.R.D. 198
(Conn. 1951).
222. Kerotest Mfg. Co. v. C-O-Two Fire Equipment Co., 342 U.S. 180, 183
(1952).
223. Heldne Curtis Industries, Inc. v. Sales Affiliates Inc., 199 F.2d 732, 734
(2d Cir. 1952).
224. Radio Corp. v. Radio Laboratories, 293 U.S. 1, 7 (1934).
225. United States v. Bell Telephone Co., 167 U.S. 224 (1897), explained in
United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 387 (1948).
226. See text following note 112 and note 201 supra.
227. 66 STAT. 803, 814 (1952), 35 U.S.C.A. § 146, par. 2, § 291 (Supp. 1953).
228. 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (Supp. 1952).
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state courts and federal courts under this provision or its predecessors
has formed the subject of a long series of adjudications by the Supreme
Court which started with Wilson v. Sanford, and has been reviewed
from time to time by the Court."0  Generally speaking it is settled
that the jurisdiction depends on the allegations and the relief prayed
for in the complaint. If the complaint directly attacks the validity of
a patent or seeks redress against a violation of the patentee's rights
flowing from his monopoly, the federal courts have exclusive jurisdic-
tion; but, unless some other reason for federal jurisdiction is present,
the state courts are the proper forum when the status of a contract
relating to the patent or the enforcement or other protection of rights
derived from such contract are the principal subjects of the adjudication
sought. In such cases, the state courts may give incidental relief
against threatened infringement, if such is the consequence of a can-
celled license.2" 1
CONCLUSION.
This lengthy inquiry can be summed up in some very brief conclu-
sions. The new patent act has not introduced any major modification
of the existing American system. Most of its new provisions consti-
tute a codification, clarification or stabilization of judicial doctrines.
Some of the changes are technically significant. In this class belong
the recognition of process patents for the new use of old devices or
products, the curbs on the misuse doctrine, the alleviation of the anti-
functionality principle in claims, and the new rules concerning the
necessity for, and availability of disclaimers. Undoubtedly, some of
these innovations will need judicial clarification. The most important
effect of the revision, however, is its significance as a reaffirmation of
the congressional belief in the social usefulness of a strong and vigorous
patent system.
From the comparative aspect it is interesting to note not only that
the great trends of the American system have kept in line with those
229. 10 How. 99 (U.S. 1850).
230. See, e.g., Hartell v. Tilghman, 99 U.S. 547 (1878); Dale Tile Mfg. Co. v.
Hyatt, 125 U.S. 46 (1888); White v. Rankin, 144 U.S. 628 (1892); Pratt v. Paris
Gas Light & Coke Co., 168 U.S. 255 (1897); Henry v. A. B. Dick Co., 224 U.S.
1 (1912) (not overruled on the jurisdictional point) ; Luckett v. Delpark, Inc., 270
U.S. 496 (1926).
231. See, e.g., H. J. Heinz Co. v. Superior Court, 266 P.2d 5 (Sup. Ct. Cal.
1954), in which the court upheld a contempt order requiring destruction of in-
fringing articles built under an invalid license agreement. The federal courts had
refused to enjoin these contempt proceedings, without taking any position in regard
to the power of the state court to curb threatened infringement by such order, for
the reason that 28 U.S.C. § 2283 did not authorize federal interference in such case.
H. J. Heinz Co. v. Owens, 189 F.2d 505, rehearing denied, 191 F.2d 257 (9th Cir.
1951).
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of the other western countries, but that, in addition, the administra-
tion of American patent law has produced numerous technical legal
problems which are directly paralleled in the other English speak-
ing countries as well as in other industrial nations, especially Ger-
many. In fact, the similarity between many German and American
patent law doctrines is startling. On the other hand, the greater in-
clination of American law to accord inventor's rights to him who has
first conceived the idea rather than to him who has first reduced it to
practice or embodied it in a patent application is worthy of emphasis
as an important policy judgment that seems preferable to the position
taken elsewhere.
The comparison of American patent law institutions with those
of other countries suggest further that a close-range field study should
be made of the experiences of other nations with opposition and can-
cellation proceedings in the Patent Office and with the so-called patents
of addition which protect subsequent improvements by the inventor
short of the inventive step requisite for independent patentability.
These devices might have utility even under our system. Perhaps the
greatest defect in the preparations for recent reform was that they did
not include a study of current practices abroad.
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